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CHAPTER 1 
 
CRYPTOCURRENCY INTERMEDIATION IN AFRICA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a lot of speculation regarding potential benefits that the adoption of cryptocurrency use and 
cryptocurrency intermediation may have for the African continent due to the macro-economic 
instability of African financial markets caused by hyperinflation; high rate of unbanked 
populations; and the need for an alternative currency to the weak; and sometimes unavailable and 
unreliable African fiat money.
1
 
 
Preiss notes that the intangible nature of cryptocurrency means that governments have no access to 
such cryptocurrency and cannot physically remove wealth from the citizens.
2
 He further notes that 
cryptocurrency not only provides a solution to the unbanked but is also a method of allowing 
economically and politically subjugated populations to control their wealth.
3
 
 
Cryptocurrency intermediation in the form of cryptocurrency remittance services have been 
established in Africa as an alternative to Western Union,
4
 MoneyGram and many others.
5
 Examples 
include cryptocurrency remittance and transfer services provided by cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries, which are third parties facilitating cryptocurrency related transactions, and in some 
cases provide storage of cryptocurrency to their users.
6
 In Africa, examples of such cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries include, such as BTCGhana; BitPesa and Belfrics.
7
  
                                                 
1
 Boateng K ‘Despite risks, cryptocurrency prints an exciting opportunity for Africa’ 14 June 2018 available at 
https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/06/cryptocurrency-opportunity-africa/ (accessed 04 November 2018); Preiss RM 
‘Cryptocurrency is the great African opportunity’ 08 August 2017 available at https://www.ntusbfcas.com/african-
business-insights/content/cryptocurrency-is-the-great-african-opportunity and 
https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/cryptocurrency-great-african-opportunity/59402/ (accessed 04 November 2018) 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Preiss (08 August 2017). 
2
 Preiss (08 August 2017). 
3
 Preiss (08 August 2017). 
4
 The Western Union is a global cross-border and cross-currency money movement provider that assists people and 
businesses to move money across the world. See Western Union ‘About Us’ available at 
https://corporate.westernunion.com/index.html (accessed 05 November 2018). 
5
 International Fund of Agricultural Development ‘Sending Money to Home to Africa Remittance Markets enabling 
environment and prospects’ October 2009 available at  
https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/sending_money_home_to_africa.pdf  (accessed 05 March 2019) 6. 
6
 Tu KV and Meredith MW ‘Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age’ Washington Law Review 90 
(2015) 273 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tu and Meredith (2015)). 
7
 Preiss (08 August 2017). 
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On the BTCGhana platform, users can make Bitcoin purchases through established platforms, and 
can, within minutes, send payment to local remittance platforms such as TigoCash, Airtel Money 
and MTN Mobile Money.
8
 These services allow African users to redeem cash at a local remittance 
outlet without having to deal with complex withdrawal and deposit methods involving bank 
accounts and credit cards, which are difficult and time consuming to obtain;
9
 and is further an 
illustration of the presence of cryptocurrency use and cryptocurrency-based intermediation in 
Africa.  
 
The purpose of this research is to advance a case for cryptocurrency-based intermediation 
regulation aimed at ensuring that the use of cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency-based 
intermediation provides adequate protection to users and intermediation is provided within the 
purview of the law. 
 
To this end, this Chapter is aimed at outlining the research background; the research objective(s); 
the significance of the research problem; research methodology followed; the chapter outlines; and 
the relevant definitions applicable to this research. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
 As a background, it is pertinent to point out the history and the salient features of 
cryptocurrency; how cryptocurrency is acquired; and examples of existing cryptocurrency, as 
is done below.  
 
 This discussion is necessary to provide an understanding of cryptocurrency and its uses; and 
in addition, cryptocurrency-based intermediation. 
 
1.1.1 History and salient features of cryptocurrency 
 
 Cryptocurrency is a math-based;
10
 decentralised;
11
 and anonymous virtual currency, which is 
not backed by any State; that is protected by cryptography;
12
 and generated by computation 
                                                 
8
 Preiss (08 August 2017). 
9
 Preiss (08 August 2017). 
10
 Financial Action Task Force FATF Report: Virtual Currencies - Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks 
(2014) 5 (hereinafter referred to as ‘FATF (2014)’).  
11
 FATF (2014) 5.  
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(“mining”), purchase, or trade.13 It is stored and tracked using peer-to-peer technology, which 
can be compared to file sharing systems such as torrent, and because cryptocurrency relies on 
distributed computing, it does not require a central clearing house, unlike government issued 
currency.
14
 
 
 Cryptocurrency relies on public and private keys to transfer value from one person to another, 
and must be cryptographically signed each time.
15
 A person would use his or her private key 
address to send cryptocurrency to another person’s public key address; and the latter would 
then access such cryptocurrency by using his or her private key address.
16
  
 
 Cryptocurrency has no physical presence and its ownership is verified by entries in a 
blockchain
17
, which is maintained over a peer-to-peer network;
18
 and it is a protocol that 
allow for the validation of transactions without the need of a trusted third party such as a 
bank, a credit card company or a recording agency
19
.  
 
Cryptocurrency transactions between a sender and receiver are signed using the participants’ 
cryptographic credentials (public and private keys) and sent to the network for validation.
20
 If 
the network validates the key signatures, then the blockchain is updated to reflect the 
transaction.
21
  
 
Once validated, cryptocurrency transactions are irreversible, unless the recipient of the 
cryptocurrency resends the cryptocurrency to the rightful owner.
22
 There is no central 
                                                                                                                                                                  
12
 FATF (2014) 5. 
13
 Engle E ‘Is Bitcoin Rat Poison: Cryptocurrency, Crime and Counterfeiting (CCC)’ (2016) 16 Journal High 
Technology Law 341-2 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Engle (2016)’). 
14
 Engle (2016) 341-2. 
15
 FATF (2014) 5. 
16 Turpin JB ‘Bitcoin: The Economic Case for a Global Virtual Currency Operating in an Unexplored Legal Framework 
21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD (2014) 337-8 referenced in Engle (2016) 341. 
17
 A blockchain is computer system that authenticates, verifies and keeps a record of all peer-to-peer transactions 
undertaken on a cryptocurrency network. For a complete definition see Paragraph 1.6.1 below.  
18
 Hughes SJ and Middlebrook ST ‘Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payment Intermediaries’ 
(2015) Yale Journal on Regulation 505 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Hughes and Middlebrook (2015)’). 
19
 Marian O ‘A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies’ (2017) 1 University of Chicago Law 
Review Online 82 55 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Marian (2017)’). 
20
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 505. 
21
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 505. 
22
 Tu and Meredith (2015) 297. 
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authority that validates the transactions; instead, the blockchain is maintained by a group of 
miners
23
 who are periodically rewarded for their service by receiving newly created bitcoin.
24
   
 
Therefore, the general features of cryptocurrency include anonymity or rather 
pseudonymity;
25
 irreversibility; no government control; no central government authority 
validation; conducting transactions directly with another person without the involvement of a 
third-party (in the conventional sense, referred to as ‘an intermediary’); and protection 
through cryptography. 
 
1.1.2 Examples of cryptocurrency 
 
 Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, was created in 2009 by ‘a member of a cryptography mailing 
list known as ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’, which is a pseudonym. 26  Nakamoto published paper 
entitled ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’27  proposing a payment system 
based on cryptographic proof instead of trust allowing any two willing parties to transact 
directly with each other without the need of a trusted third party.
28
 Following the release of 
Nakamoto’s paper, various other cryptocurrencies were created, building on and 
sophisticating the idea released by Nakamoto, which are discussed below. 
 
 Hughes notes that each cryptocurrency has unique features. Bitcoin is one example of a 
cryptocurrency, however there are many other forms of cryptocurrency, such as Ethereum, 
Ripple, Litecoin, Dash and Metal.
29
 For the purpose of this discussion, reference will only be 
made to Bitcoin, Ethereum and Ripple. 
                                                 
23
 Miners provide computational services to the cryptocurrency network by essentially confirming a cryptocurrency 
transaction. See the compete definition under Paragraph 1.6.8 below. 
24
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 505. 
25
 Transacting parties are not identified by their actual proper names or otherwise used identifiers but by cryptocurrency 
account addresses. Account owners who execute a transaction with their accounts (receive or send cryptocurrency units) 
reveal part of their anonymity to the owner of the other transaction account. If a user pays for a good in a store using 
cryptocurrency, the merchant knows that the account from which the payment was sent belongs to that user. Then the 
level of the account anonymity depends on the level of the user’s physical anonymity towards the merchant, that is, 
whether the merchant knows the user by name, or can recognise the user by face. Account owners can voluntarily 
reveal their identity. See Lansky J ‘Possible State Approaches to Cryptocurrencies’ Journal of System Integration 
(2018) 21 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Lansky (2018)’). 
26
 Guadamaz A ‘New Kids on the Blockchain’ (2018) 2018 Jotwell: The Journal of Things we like (Lots) 1. Guadamaz 
provides a review of Gerard D Attack of the 50 Foot Blockchain: Bitcoin, Blockchain and Smart Contracts (2017). 
27
 Nakamoto S ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 31 October 2008; also published in (2017) 1 
Blockchain Technology and Digital Currency National Institute A-1-[i] (hereinafter referred to as ‘Nakamoto (2008’). 
28
 Nakamoto (2008) 1. Also see Gerard VC ‘Virtual Currencies: Growing Regulatory Framework and Challenges in 
Emerging Fintech Ecosystem’ (2107) 21 North Carolina Banking Institute 132. 
29
 Hughes (2017) 4. 
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 Bitcoin is considered to be the most prominent cryptocurrency and has the largest market 
capitalisation followed by Ethereum and Ripple.
30
 Ethereum and Ripple networks have 
different design features from the Bitcoin protocol.
31
 Ethereum allows users to program smart 
contracts that mimic physical contracts but are stored on a decentralised and distributed 
blockchain database.
32
  
 
 In contrast with the Bitcoin and Ethereum technologies, Ripple is referred to as a closed or 
private blockchain whereby specific users control witch transactions are verified on the 
network.
 33
 This is in contrast with the open or public structure of the Bitcoin and Ethereum 
blockchains that employ a decentralised decision-making model whereby any user, with a 
given amount of investment, can become a transaction validator.
34
  
 
1.1.3 Acquiring cryptocurrency 
 
 Users may obtain cryptocurrency in three (3) ways: 
 
(a) Computation (mining): New cryptocurrency may be mined by users that offer their 
computational resources to the various cryptocurrency networks to perform the computational 
work needed to support the system. In return for providing computational resources such 
users are rewarded with new bitcoin based on their share of computation used. As this process 
is analogous to gold prospectors using their equipment to mine for gold, the process is 
referred to as mining.
35
 
 
                                                 
30
 Hughes (2017) 4-5. 
31
 Hughes (2017) 4-5. 
32
 Hughes (2017) 4-5. 
33
 Hughes (2017) 5. 
34
 Hughes (2017) 5. 
35
 Martinson JP & Masterson CP ‘Bitcoin and the Secured Lender’ (2014) 33 Banking & Fin. Services Pol’Y Rep. 13-
14; referred to in Engle (2016) fn 5 341 insofar as it relates to Bitcoin; Hamilton D ‘Ethereum Mining vs. Bitcoin 
Mining: Which is more profitable?’ 04 October 2018 available at https://coincentral.com/ethereum-mining-vs-bitcoin-
mining-which-is-more-profitable/ (accessed 05 March 2019), which provides that “the primary functions behind 
Ethereum mining process are the same as Bitcoin”; Orgera S ‘Is Litecoin the same as Bitcoin?’ 12 February 2019 
available at https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-litecoin-4151693 (accessed 05 March 2019), which provides that miners 
acquire Litecoin through the mining process. 
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(b) Purchase: Cryptocurrency can be purchased on currency exchanges in a similar manner to 
exchanging fiat (nationally designated) currency (for instance the US Dollar) for any other 
fiat currency (for instance Euro).
 36
  
  
(c) Trade: Goods and services may be purchased by using cryptocurrency as means of 
payment.
37
 
 
1.1.4 The introduction of intermediation in the cryptocurrency environment 
  
 The growing acceptance of Bitcoin has resulted in the development of various third-party 
services designated to facilitate the use of Bitcoin.
38
 Such intermediaries, acting as custodians 
of cryptocurrency or cryptocurrency credentials originally belonging to their clients; and 
facilitating and clearing transactions for users.
39
 
 
 Where an intermediary is involved in cryptocurrency transactions, the transactions are 
characterised as either “off the block chain” 40  or “on the blockchain”. 41  Cryptocurrency 
transactions are undertaken by either centralised cryptocurrency-based intermediaries as is in 
the case of “off the blockchain” transactions or decentralised cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries, as is in the case of “on the blockchain” transactions.42 
 
 On the one hand, decentralised cryptocurrency-based intermediaries by undertaking “on the 
blockchain” transactions merely link and pair buyers and sellers of cryptocurrency.43 The 
buyer and seller conduct their transaction peer-to-peer on the particular cryptocurrency 
network.
44
 
 
                                                 
36
 Martinson JP & Masterson CP ‘Bitcoin and the Secured Lender’ (2014) 33 Banking & Fin. Services Pol’Y Rep. 13-
14; referred to in Engle (2016) fn 5 341 insofar as it relates to Bitcoin. 
37
 Martinson JP & Masterson CP ‘Bitcoin and the Secured Lender’ (2014) 33 Banking & Fin. Services Pol’Y Rep. 13-
14; referred to in Engle (2016) fn 5 341 insofar as it relates to Bitcoin. 
38
 Tu and Meredith (2015) 275. 
39
 Hughes and Middlebrook 497. 
40
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 497- 498. 
41
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 497- 498. 
42
 The Mission Daily ‘Decentralised Cryptocurrency Exchanges: A Comprehensive Overview 21 February 2018 
available at https://medium.com/the-mission/decentralized-cryptocurrency-exchanges-a-comprehensive-overview-
a154a92ac1cb (accessed 01 August 2018). 
43
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 497- 498. 
44
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 497- 498. 
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 On the other hand, centralised cryptocurrency-based intermediaries facilitate the conduct “off 
the blockchain” transactions, which may not appear in the public ledger at all, or if they do, 
they appear as transactions involving not the sender and the receiver, but the intermediaries.
45
  
 
 Examples of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries operating within Africa include, but are not 
limited to, BitPesa; Luno; Belfrics; and BTCGhana. All of these cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries provide services ranging from connecting buyers and sellers of cryptocurrency; 
acting as buyers and sellers of cryptocurrency; storage and holding of cryptocurrency; the 
exchange of cryptocurrency for other forms of cryptocurrency and/or fiat (national or local) 
currency; and the provision of remittance services. 
  
 Intermediaries to cryptocurrency transactions act similar to intermediaries to transactions in 
traditional payment systems. They pose similar types of credit and liquidity risks to 
consumers, market participants, and national economies.
46
  
 
Despite the similarities between transactions in the traditional payment system and 
cryptocurrency transactions through intermediaries, in 2014, 2015 and 2018 respectively, 
central banking authorities within Africa, including South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria,
47
 issued 
position papers and press releases stating that cryptocurrency was not recognised as legal 
tender.
48
 
 
None of these position papers and press releases makes reference to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries or the application of legislation regulating conventional financial 
intermediaries to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. It is therefore prudent to undertake an 
analysis of the relevant legislation to determine whether such legislation may be applicable to 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, the services they provide and their operations. 
 
If the analysis concludes that current legislation governing, supervising and regulating 
conventional financial intermediaries is not applicable or cannot be applied even with some 
                                                 
45
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 497- 498. 
46
 Hughes and Middlebrook (2015) 498. 
47
 South African Reserve Bank ‘Position Paper on Virtual Currencies’ (2014) (hereinafter referred to as ‘SARB 
(2014)’); Central Bank of Kenya ‘Public Notice: Caution to the Public on Virtual Currencies such as Bitcoin’ (2015) 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CBK (2015)’); Central Bank of Nigeria ‘Press Release: Virtual Currencies not Legal Tender 
in Nigeria’ (2018) (hereinafter referred to as ‘CBN (2018)’). 
48
 SARB (2014) 2; CBK (2015); and CBN (2018).  
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modification, then this research is aimed at finding and proposing a regulatory framework 
suitable and adequate to regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE(S)  
 
 The main objective of this research is to design a cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ 
regulatory legal framework for Africa. To this end, the main objective will be achieved 
through addressing the following sub-objectives:  
  
1.2.1 What are cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; which type of activities and/or services do 
they provide; and which types of risks emanate from the provision and use of such activities 
and/or services?  
 
1.2.2 Whether existing regulatory legal frameworks within South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria can be 
applied to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries? 
 
1.2.3 If not, whether such legislation would be suitable to regulate cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries within Africa? 
 
1.2.4 If existing regulatory legal frameworks are insufficient, which regulatory approach or 
approaches is/are best suited for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation within 
Africa? 
 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 Despite the position of the central banking authorities in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya 
postulated above, cryptocurrency-based intermediary regulation becomes significant if one 
considers potential losses that may be suffered by users of services of cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and explore potential remedies that may be available to such users. 
 
 Furthermore, the potential use of cryptocurrency as a tool to fund illicit activities through 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries warrants the question of the applicability of public law 
measures applicable to money-laundering; theft; illicit drugs; terrorism financing and many 
others. In the absence of such application, cryptocurrency-based intermediaries may become 
complacent in such activities. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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 Motsi-Omoijiade
49
 points out several risks that are akin to cryptocurrency exchanges and 
wallet providers.  In relation to cryptocurrency exchanges, she notes that the most frequent 
manifestation of risk has to do with loss of funds held in escrow by hacking.
50
 In addition, the 
possible use of exchange services for money laundering, terrorist funding and tax avoidance is 
another concern.
51
 
 
 In respect of cryptocurrency wallet providers, Motsi-Omoijiade notes that the main risk for 
wallet providers has to do with the possibility of loss or theft of stored cryptocurrency mainly 
through hacking.
52
 
 
There are various examples of cryptocurrency intermediaries that were and are potentially 
being hacked globally and the most noticeable examples of hacked cryptocurrency 
intermediaries include MTGox and Coinbase. Mt. Gox, once Bitcoin's biggest exchange, 
suspended trading in February 2014, shuttered its website, and filed for bankruptcy after 
announcing that more than $400 million worth of customer Bitcoins had vanished without 
recourse due to computer hackings.
53
  
 
 In addition, the value of cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, has increased significantly therefore, 
cryptocurrency-related losses will result in the loss of a substantial amount of money to the 
cryptocurrency owner.
54
 
 
 Therefore, as it is already evident that cryptocurrency intermediaries provide services as 
outlined above, it is only prudent, considering the risks involved, that cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries’ regulation is significant and necessary. 
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1.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
1.4.1 The research, for the purpose of this mini-thesis will be desktop based, largely relying on 
library resources and internet sources. 
 
1.4.2 In order to examine the applicability and suitability of existing legislation governing 
comparable or similar services to that which is provided by cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries, existing legislation regulating such comparable or similar services within 
South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria will be examined.  
 
The identified African countries are selected for such examination for illustrative purposes 
and due to the existence and prominence of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries within those 
African countries. Furthermore, drawing an analysis of all African countries is not possible, 
however it is envisaged that the outcome of this research will be relevant across Africa due 
the nature of cryptocurrency.  
 
1.4.3 In order to explore global regulatory responses to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and 
determine the most suitable regulatory approach to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ 
regulation in Africa, countries such as China and India (prohibits the conducting of 
cryptocurrency-related activities or frustrates the provision of such activities); Philippines, the 
United States of America Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Australia and Japan 
(amends existing legislation to incorporated cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation); 
and Abu Dhabi Global Market Guidance and the New York State Department of Financial 
Services’ Regulations (enacted new legislation to govern cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries) will be examined.   
 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 
1.5.1 Chapter One provides an overview of cryptocurrency intermediation in Africa; and an 
overview of cryptocurrency, examples of cryptocurrency and its acquisition. It further sets out 
the research objectives and the significance of the research; the methodology that will be 
followed; and the relevant definitions. 
 
1.5.2 Chapter Two examines cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, the various forms of 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; examples of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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operating within Africa, more particularly within South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya; and the 
potential risks that may affect users of the cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ services and 
risks particular to the provision of such services. 
 
1.5.3 Chapter Three outlines and analyses various legislation that governs conventional financial 
intermediaries in Africa, more particularly within South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. The aim 
of this analysis is to determine whether such legislation is applicable to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries. 
 
 In addition, this chapter further explores the suitability of such existing legislation to govern 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
1.5.4 Chapter Four examines global regulatory responses to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
with the aim of identifying the most suitable regulatory response to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries’ regulation. 
 
1.5.5 Chapter Five provides a brief overview of conclusions reached in the preceding chapters; 
and provides recommendations on the regulatory legal framework for cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries’ regulation; the scope of application of such recommended regulatory legal 
framework; relevant aspects that should form part of such recommended regulatory legal 
framework; issues that fall outside of scope of such recommended regulatory legal approach; 
and the application of the recommended regulatory legal framework within Africa. 
 
1.6 Definitions 
 
 Due to the technical nature of this research, it is pertinent to define the following terms: 
 
1.6.1 ‘Blockchain’ is a trustless technology, which enables exchanges for value over a computer 
network that can be verified, monitored, and enforced without the presence of a trusted third 
party or central institution;
55
 an authentication and verification technology, which enables 
more efficient title transfers and ownership verification;
56
 is decentralised as it can perform its 
                                                 
55
 Nakamoto S ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2009) 8 available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf 
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functions with minimal trust without using centralised institutions;
57
 and it is borderless and 
frictionless as it can provide cheaper and faster infrastructure for exchanging units of value;
58
 
 
1.6.2 ‘Convertible (or open) virtual currency’ has an equivalent in real currency and can be 
exchanged back-and-forth for real currency. Examples include Bitcoin;
59
 
 
1.6.3 A ‘cryptocurrency wallet’ is a means, such as a software application or other mechanism or 
medium, for holding; storing and transferring cryptocurrency;
60
 
 
1.6.4 ‘Cryptography’ is the manner or means by which digital information and transactions are 
secured;
61
 
 
1.6.5 ‘Decentralised cryptocurrencies’ are distributed, open source math-based peer-to-peer virtual 
currencies that have no central administering authority and no central monitoring or oversight. 
Examples include Bitcoin;
62
 
 
1.6.6 ‘Decentralised public ledger’ is a complete record of all past transactions on the 
cryptocurrency network and refers to the blockchain;
63
 
1.6.7 ‘Distributed’ refers to the manner in which each transaction on a virtual currency network is 
distributed among a network of participants who run the algorithm to validate the 
transaction;
64
 
 
1.6.8 A ‘miner’ is an individual or entity that participates in a decentralised virtual currency 
network by running special software to solve complex algorithms in a decentralised proof-of-
work or other distributed proof system used to validate transactions in virtual currency 
system;
65
 and mining has a corresponding meaning;  
 
                                                 
57
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60
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1.6.9 ‘Peer-to-Peer’ means from one party to another without going through a financial 
institution;
66
 
 
1.6.10 ‘Virtual Currency’ is a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and 
functions as a medium of exchange; and/or a unit of account; and/or a store of value but does 
not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction.
67
 Virtual currency can either be convertible or 
non-convertible.
68
 
 
 During discussions in this research, more particularly in chapter four, reference is made to 
‘virtual currency’, which shall mean ‘cryptocurrency’; and reference to ‘Bitcoin’ includes all 
forms of cryptocurrency, unless the context provides otherwise. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the aspects that will be examined, explored, analysed and 
considered in this research with the aim of proposing a regulatory legal framework for 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
The next chapter will provide an overview of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and identify the 
potential risks to which users will be susceptible when using the services of cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and, in addition those risks to which cryptocurrency-based intermediaries themselves 
are exposed and susceptible. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CRYPTOCURRENCY-BASED INTERMEDIARIES: AN OVERVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In chapter one, the concept of cryptocurrency was introduced, which, as indicated in chapter one, is 
a digital currency neither issued nor controlled or backed by any government. It can be bought or 
sold, exchanged or transferred, or stored and transactions are recorded on a decentralised network 
neither owned nor controlled by any person or government; it can be used to buy goods and services 
from merchants that accept it as a method of payment; and cryptocurrency transactions can take 
place person-to-person without any involvement of a third-party.  
 
However, as further indicated in chapter one, the advent of need for cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries was a necessity in order to alleviate user challenges regarding exchanging 
cryptocurrency for national currency; and storing cryptocurrency securely.  
 
The advent of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries resulted in the creation of several types of 
business models of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, which are third parties facilitating 
cryptocurrency-related transactions and providing storage for cryptocurrency.  
 
These business models of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are all aimed at facilitating the 
purchase and sale of cryptocurrencies; providing online and offline storage and holding of 
cryptocurrencies; exchanging cryptocurrencies for fiat (national) currencies and other 
cryptocurrencies; finding buyers and sellers of cryptocurrencies and facilitating the sale and 
purchase of cryptocurrencies; and facilitating the remittance of cryptocurrency.
69
  
 
Intermediation within the cryptocurrency market is mainly undertaken by cryptocurrency-based 
exchanges, cryptocurrency wallet providers, and cryptocurrency-based remittance service 
providers.
70
   
 
                                                 
69
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70
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It is the purpose of this chapter to provide an overview of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, the 
activities they conduct, services they provide, the potential risks the use of their services pose to 
users of such services, and the potential risks that may materialise from conducting such activities 
or provision of such services.  
 
This overview is necessary to provide an understanding of the subject-matter, which will form the 
basis of the recommended regulatory legal framework aimed at governing cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries. 
 
This chapter will further provide examples of selected cryptocurrency-based intermediaries that 
operate within selected African countries; and examples of cryptocurrency-based intermediary 
failure and/or hacking in order to identify and highlight potential risks that cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and their users may be susceptible to. 
 
2.1 Types of cryptocurrency-based intermediation 
    
 The following section outlines various types of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, namely 
cryptocurrency-based exchanges, cryptocurrency wallet service providers and cryptocurrency-
based remittance service providers. 
 
2.1.1 Cryptocurrency-based exchanges 
 
 Hileman and Rauchs define a cryptocurrency-based exchange as any entity that allows 
customers (users) to exchange (buy or sell) cryptocurrencies for other forms of money or 
cryptocurrencies.
71
 
 
 Cryptocurrency-based exchanges play an essential role in the cryptocurrency economy by 
offering a marketplace for trading, liquidity, and price discovery.
72
  The primary role of 
cryptocurrency-based exchanges is to convert cryptocurrencies into fiat currency
73
 or other 
forms of cryptocurrency.
74
  
                                                 
71
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 In addition, cryptocurrency-based exchanges are the primary hub for cryptocurrency trading 
activities (including derivatives) with some offering limited storage facilities for 
cryptocurrency-denominated investments to their customers.
75
 
 
(a) Currency conversion function performed by cryptocurrency-based exchanges 
 
 Cryptocurrency-based exchanges perform the currency conversion function in two 
operationally distinct ways, which is as follows: 
 
 First stage: During this stage the cryptocurrency-based exchange matches buyers and sellers 
of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and other currencies.
76
  
 
 Second stage: During this stage the prospective seller transfers Bitcoin to the cryptocurrency-
based exchange for sale.
77
 The buyer is then responsible for ensuring that it provides the 
cryptocurrency-based exchange with sufficient funds, denominated in appropriate currency, to 
complete the purchase.
78
  
 
 Once the Bitcoin and other funds have been successfully transferred to the cryptocurrency-
based exchange, the trade is then cleared and settled, with Bitcoin transferred to the buyer and 
the corresponding funds to the seller.
79
 
 
 Therefore, the cryptocurrency-based exchange acts as a platform that links or matches the 
buyer and the seller; acts as a conduit for conducting the purchased and sale of cryptocurrency 
transaction.  
 
 Furthermore, the seller deposits the cryptocurrency into a wallet provided by the 
cryptocurrency-based exchange; and the buyer deposits funds (money in the form of 
fiat/national currency) into an account provided by the cryptocurrency-based exchange.
80
 The 
transaction is then complete once the cryptocurrency is transferred to the buyer and the seller 
receives payment. 
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(b) Access to users’ private keys 
  
 In order to ensure constant and adequate liquidity to execute transactions in near real-time, 
cryptocurrency-based exchange have access to the private keys assigned to each of its users.
81
  
 
 The act of depositing bitcoin in an cryptocurrency-based exchange and ceding exclusive use 
of private key to the cryptocurrency-based exchange invokes fiduciary duties and the need for 
trust between the exchange the customer. Additionally, the exchange requests and has access 
to customer’s bank details and other identity markers against invoking a duty of trust in the 
protection of customers’ data.82 
 
(c) Categories of cryptocurrency-based exchange 
 
 Cryptocurrency-based exchange can be categorised as either centralised or decentralised, the 
difference between the two are represented by the following factors:
83
 
 
 Control of funds:
84
 In a decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchange platform, users 
transact directly with their peers without the need for a central server, and funds are controlled 
by the users and participants in the platform; whereas in a centralised cryptocurrency 
platform, users make deposits to the exchange in order to facilitate an exchange trading 
transaction, and funds are controlled by the exchanged service. 
 
 Anonymity:
85
 In a decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchange platform anonymity is key 
feature, whereas in a centralised cryptocurrency-based exchange platform may or can allow 
anonymous trading. 
 
 Authentication:
86
 In a decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchange platform there is no 
need to rely on a third-party intermediary. By means of smart contracts and a number of 
                                                 
81
 Motsi-Omoijiade (2018) 211. 
82
 Motsi-Omoijiade (2018) 211. 
83
 The Mission Daily ‘Decentralise Cryptocurrency Exchanges: A Comprehensive Overview 21 February 2018 
available at https://medium.com/the-mission/decentralized-cryptocurrency-exchanges-a-comprehensive-overview-
a154a92ac1cb (accessed 01 August 2018). 
84
 The Mission Daily ‘Decentralise Cryptocurrency Exchanges: A Comprehensive Overview 21 February 2018 
available at https://medium.com/the-mission/decentralized-cryptocurrency-exchanges-a-comprehensive-overview-
a154a92ac1cb (accessed 01 August 2018) (hereinafter referred to as The Mission Daily (21 February 2018)’). 
85
 The Mission Daily (21 February 2018) 
86
 The Mission Daily (21 February 2018) 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 29 
blockchain protocol implementations, the entire system is built to provide trust-less 
authentication and authorisation of cryptocurrency-based exchange transactions. 
 
 On the other hand, in a centralised cryptocurrency-based exchange platform users rely on the 
platform to authenticate and authorise their transactions, and therefore, in a way, the platform 
is a third-party intermediary providing trusted cryptocurrency-based exchange services.
87
 
 
(d) The shadow payment system and cryptocurrency-based exchange 
  
 According to Awrey and Van Zweiten,
88
 cryptocurrency-based exchanges are one of the new 
financial innovations or rather financial intermediaries that operate outside of the 
conventional financial system providing services similar to conventional financial 
intermediaries. The system with which these new financial intermediaries operate is referred 
to as the ‘shadow payment system’.89 
 
 According to Awrey and Van Zweiten, these new financial intermediaries share two core 
features, namely performing the same basic payment functions as conventional deposit-taking 
banks and providing customers with custodial and transactional storage, and liquidity.
90
 
  
Therefore, cryptocurrency-based exchange are marketplaces or platforms providing exchange 
services as set out above; they are categorised as either centralised conducting transactions off-the-
blockchain
91
 or decentralised conducting transactions on-the-blockchain.
92
  
 
In addition, a user intending to use the services of a cryptocurrency-based exchange is required to 
create a cryptocurrency wallet with the cryptocurrency-based exchange; deposit cryptocurrency into 
the created wallet, and fiat currency into an account identified by the cryptocurrency-based 
exchange. 
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2.1.2 Cryptocurrency Wallet Providers 
 
 Cryptocurrency wallet providers hold cryptocurrency on behalf of the user and have 
cryptographic control over all the users’ cryptocurrency wallet. 93  Cryptocurrency wallet 
providers are exclusively concerned with the storage of cryptocurrency.
94
  
 
 Cryptocurrency wallet services providers offer storage facilities either online (hot storage) or 
offline (cold storage) with most offline storage services being offered at a fee and online 
storage often taking place at no direct cost to the customers.
95
 Cryptocurrency wallet services 
providers are accessed by the user either through mobile applications, web interfaces, desktop 
clients (which requires downloading of software) or a combination of the three.
96
 
 
 There are two ways in which cryptocurrency wallets can be stored or held, namely custodial 
and non-custodial cryptocurrency wallets, which are discussed below: 
 
(a) Custodial wallets:
97
 A custodial wallet is one in which the user’s private key is stored by a 
third party, such as an cryptocurrency-based exchange or wallet service providers. The user 
entrusts his/her/its wallet to the cryptocurrency wallet provider. The cryptocurrency wallet 
service provider is able to, unilaterally, make transfers from a user’s account without the 
user’s authorisation.98 
 
 However, reputable wallet services implement technical, procedural and sometimes legal 
measures to ensure transactions are authorised by the users, but there is no cryptographic 
block to keep wallet service providers from confiscating customer funds.
99
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(b) Non-custodial wallets:
100
 This may be web, paper, mobile, desktop and hardware wallets, 
which is the case also with custodial wallets, however non-custodial wallets allow the user to 
fully control his/her/its funds and is regarded as more secure. This type of wallet does not 
require the services of a wallet service provide and the cryptocurrency owner keeps custody 
of his/her/its own wallet. 
 
Therefore, users can store their cryptocurrency in a custodial or a non-custodial wallet. The use of 
non-custodial wallet does not require the use of cryptocurrency wallet services providers, whereas 
the use of a cryptocurrency wallet services provider results in custodial wallet storage.  
 
2.1.3 Cryptocurrency-based remittance services providers 
 
 Cryptocurrency-based remittance services providers (‘cryptocurrency remittance provider’) 
exploit the distributed ledger technology’s ability to transfer and exchange value in near real 
time to and from anywhere in the world, leveraging the exchangeability of any cryptocurrency 
into any fiat currency across the world.
101
  
 
 Cryptocurrency remittance providers allow the transfer of value that can be effected quickly, 
requiring users only to have network access and a smartphone to transact from anywhere in 
the world.
102
  
 
 The use of cryptocurrency remittance provider permits users to send fiat currency to a 
recipient who receives a payout in fiat currency.
103
 The cryptocurrency remittance provider 
uses blockchain technology to transfer funds and subsequently convert cryptocurrency into 
the recipient’s fiat currency for them to withdraw through a bank account, mobile phone or 
teller.
104
 
 
In a nutshell, a cryptocurrency remittance provider intermediates the transfer of cryptocurrency 
from one person at one end and pays to another fiat currency at the other end. Cryptocurrency 
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remittance providers facilitate the remittance of cryptocurrency from one person to another 
irrespective of where in the world both persons find themselves, which is no different from the 
remittance services undertaken by conventional remittance providers. 
 
2.2 Examples of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries operating within South Africa, Kenya 
and Nigeria 
 
 There are various cryptocurrency-based intermediaries that operate across Africa. Examples 
include Luno operating in South Africa and Nigeria; Belfrics operating in Kenya, Nigeria and 
Tanzania; and BitPesa that operating in Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, DRC, Senegal and 
Uganda.  
 
2.2.1  Luno 
  
 Luno is a company registered in terms of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 and 
the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act Cap. C20 of 2004.
105
 Luno provides 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary services in South Africa; Nigeria; and other countries 
globally.  
 
 Luno is a cryptocurrency-based platform that connects potential buyers and sellers of 
cryptocurrency. Luno does not buy or sell cryptocurrency neither does it set the exchange 
rate, meaning that the rate of exchange is determined sole by the buyer and the seller.
106
 
 
 Users of Luno services are required to commit to and comply with Terms of Use.
107
 The 
following salient features of the Terms of Use are pertinent to this discussion: 
 
(a) Paragraph 6: Identity Verification 
  
 Luno claims to maintain the highest level of ‘Know your customer’ processes and controls as 
part of combating fraud and assisting in the prevention money laundering and terrorist 
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financing.
108
 Therefore, users are required to provide certain personal details and documents 
when opening a Luno account. 
 
(b) Paragraph 7: The Luno Wallet 
  
 The Luno Wallet allows a holder to send, receive and store cryptocurrency. The Luno Wallet 
is only available in relation to cryptocurrency that Luno, in its sole discretion decides to 
support (supported cryptocurrency). 
 
 The Luno Wallet further permits the deposit of local currency, which may only be used for 
the purchase of supported currency; and the withdrawal to an approved bank account.  
 
 Under Paragraphs 8 and 9, the Terms of Use further elaborates various aspects that will 
govern deposits and withdrawals, which are as follows: 
 
 Deposits: Luno requires identity verification before a user can deposit local currency into the 
Luno Wallet by depositing funds in a Luno bank account (referred to as ‘the deposit’). Luno 
provides the details of the Luno bank account into which the deposit is to be made. 
 
 Withdrawals: Where the user adds his or her bank account details to the Luno account, the 
user may withdraw funds from his or her Luno Wallet to his or her bank account. This is 
referred to as ‘withdrawal’.  
 
Furthermore, Luno processes transactions according to the user’s instructions. The user 
accepts and agrees that Luno does not: 
 
(i) guarantee the identity of any user, receiver or other third party to a Luno Wallet transaction. It 
is therefore the sole responsibility of the user to ensure that all transaction details are correct 
and to verify all transaction information prior to submitting transactions to Luno; and 
(ii) has no control over, or liability in relation to, the delivery quality or any other aspect of any 
goods or services that the user may buy from or sell to any third party. 
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 Insofar as it relates to the receipt of cryptocurrency, the user may receive supported 
cryptocurrency into his/her Luno Wallet by providing a sender with a receiver address 
generated in his or her Luno Wallet. The user’s Luno Wallet will only be credited with 
supported cryptocurrency sent to a receive address generated through the user’s Luno Wallet 
and associated with that supported cryptocurrency. 
 
 For instance, the user’s Luno Wallet will be credited with ETH, which is the Ethereum 
currency, when it is sent to ETH receive address generated through the user’s wallet. 
 
(c) Paragraph 10: Instant buy or sell 
 
 Luno wallet holders may use the instant buy or sell service to buy or sell a chosen amount of 
supported cryptocurrency at the quoted exchange rate. In using the instant buy or sell, the user 
accepts and agrees, amongst other things, that Luno is not acting as the user’s broker, 
intermediary, agent or advisor or in any fiduciary capacity and no information or 
communication provided by Luno in relation to an instant buy or sell transaction will 
constitute advice.  
 
(d) Paragraph 11: The Luno Exchange 
 
 The Luno Exchange is an order book exchange platform for cryptocurrencies intended for use 
by users. In using the Luno Exchange, users agree and accept the following: 
 
(i) that all trades are executed automatically, based on customer’s order instructions and cannot 
be reversed; and 
 
(ii) that Luno makes no guarantee that Luno Exchange will be available without interruption; that 
there will be no delays, failures, errors, omissions or loss of transmitted information; or that 
any order will be executed, accepted, recorded or remain open. 
 
(e) Paragraph13: Account Security 
 
 Luno securely stores cryptocurrency private keys associated with any Luno account. The user 
accepts and agrees that Luno retains full ownership and control of the private keys associated 
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with his or her Luno account. The user has no control of, access to, or the ability to use such 
private keys. 
 
(f) Paragraph 15: Transaction on cryptocurrency networks 
 
 When the user uses his or her Luno account to send or receive cryptocurrency, the transaction 
must be recorded in the cryptocurrency public ledger associated with the relevant 
cryptocurrency network. The cryptocurrency network is solely responsible for verifying and 
confirming any such transaction. 
 
 Luno does not or cannot confirm, cancel or reverse transactions on cryptocurrency network, 
other than confirming that the network has completed the transaction. 
 
(g) Paragraph 16: Account inactivity 
 
 Local currency deposited into a Luno Wallet may only be used to purchase supported 
cryptocurrency and/or withdrawal to an approved bank account. The Luno wallet should not 
be used for the purpose of storing local currency. 
 
 In the event that the Luno Wallet holds funds and Luno has no record of any use of the Luno 
account for years or Luno is unable to contact the user, Luno will contact and deliver such 
funds to the relevant authorities as unclaimed property. 
 
(h) Paragraph 27: Disputes 
 
 In terms of Paragraph 27, the Terms of Use are governed by the Law of Singapore and the 
user and the parties (Luno and the user) submit any dispute arising from the Terms of Use to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore. 
 
Therefore, Luno is an example of a decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchange, meaning that 
transaction conducted through Luno are recorded ‘on the blockchain’; and provides custodial wallet 
storage services to its users, meaning that Luno retains full ownership of the users private keys. 
Luno however submits that it will only conduct transactions on the instruction of the user. 
In addition, it is clear that the relationship between Luno and its users is government by contract as 
postulated in the Terms of Use. Therefore, the users only obtain the rights and incur the obligations 
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set out in the Terms of Use; and any dispute arising between the user and Luno will be resolved in 
terms of the Terms of Use. 
 
Luno further does not allow users to hold fiat currency for any other purpose but to purchase 
cryptocurrency. Luno further claims to adhere to strict ‘know-your-customer’ rules, processes and 
controls aimed at combating fraud; prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. To this 
end, Luno requires its users to provide verifiable identity information and in addition, similar 
information for third parties that such users may trade with.  
 
2.2.2 Belfrics 
 
 The use of Belfrics’ services is subject to Terms and Conditions, which requires user 
subscription. Belfrics provides a payment gateway, which allows its customers to pay in 
cryptocurrency; store their funds in a free cryptocurrency wallet; exchange cryptocurrency; 
provides a cryptocurrency trading platform.
109
 
 
 Terms and Conditions
110
 of using Belfrics’ services provide the following: 
 
(a) Paragraph 1: Preliminary Provisions 
 
 Paragraph 1.3.3 provides that all members are users but not all users are members. For 
consistency purposes, these terms will be used according to their applicability to this 
discussion. Furthermore, in terms of Paragraph 1.2 users may access certain public areas of 
the Belfrics website, however only members may use the Exchange or ancillary services. 
 
(b) Paragraph 2: Explanation of Membership and Exchange 
 
 Belfrics does not provide or issue members any cryptocurrency. All cryptocurrency traded or 
exchanged by and between members originate from and between members themselves. 
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 All cryptocurrency transferred to Belfrics by the members for use within the exchange is held 
in an omnibus client account controlled by the Exchange. The Exchange maintains an internal 
ledger recording the amount of cryptocurrency each member possesses in the omnibus client 
account and all transactions between the members are based on such ledger. 
 
 Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 further provide that the member’s accounts and any available currency 
therein is not a credit card, bank account or deposits; and that Belfrics’ services are not 
financial instruments. Furthermore, no interest will be paid on any funds or currency. Belfrics 
maintains depository accounts with a reputable bank for the customers. 
 
 In order to use the Exchange, members must create an account. The account would be used to 
store various cryptocurrency amounts as deposited by the member. In opening an account, the 
member will be required to provide personal information, which will be subject to verification 
by Belfrics. 
  
 In order to use Belfrics services and the Exchange, the member is required to disclose 
information pertaining to third party accounts, including the member’s bank account, Bitcoin 
addresses and related information. 
 
(c) Paragraph 2.14: Funding Member’s account 
 
 After creating the account, the member may be able to fund his or her account by transferring 
bitcoin from his or her accounts with such third party cryptocurrency providers into the 
account operated by the Exchange. 
 
 For instance, to fund his or her account with 10 bitcoin (BTC), the member would use the 
third party software to transfer his or her own pre-existing 10 BTC to the Exchange’s Bitcoin 
address for omnibus client account. The Exchange would then credit the member’s account 
with 10 BTC on the Exchange’s ledger and the member would be able to trade this BTC for 
Kenyan shilling on the Exchange. 
 
(d) Paragraph 2.15: Trading 
 
 After the member has funded his or her account, the member may commence trading 
cryptocurrency with other users. Trading is achieved through bids and offers to buy and sell 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 38 
cryptocurrency. Matching bids and offers to buy and sell cryptocurrency are automatically 
paired by the Exchange and the Exchange will notify the respective members that the order 
has been executed. 
 
 The members may only sell as much cryptocurrency as is recorded by Belfrics in the 
Exchange ledger, plus the applicable fee. Once the order has been executed; the appropriated 
currencies have been credited and debited from the member’s account, then the transaction is 
perceived as completed and irreversible. 
 
(e) Paragraph 2.19: Withdrawing currency 
 
 The members are allowed to withdraw their cryptocurrency upon requests from Belfrics. The 
members may withdraw all or some of their cryptocurrency, and are not required to keep a 
certain limit in their accounts. 
 
(f) Paragraphs 14.1: Binding arbitration and Governing Law 
 
 In terms Paragraph 14.1 any dispute arising out of the Belfrics (Nigeria) Terms and 
Conditions must be resolved, first through negotiation, and  in the event that negotiation fails, 
through binding arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of Lagos Court of 
Arbitration International Centre of Arbitration. 
 
 The same process is stipulated in Belfrics Kenya Terms and Conditions, except that the 
applicable rules for arbitration are the Arbitration Rules of the Nairobi Center of International 
Arbitration. 
 
 The relevant law governing any dispute between the parties is, in terms of Belfrics Nigeria 
Terms and Conditions, Nigerian Law; and that disputes between parties is, in terms of 
Belfrics Kenya Terms and Conditions, Kenyan Law. 
 
 Other service: Belfrics also provides remittance services.
111
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Therefore, Belfrics provides a whole range of services, such as electronic wallet storage for 
cryptocurrency; exchange (trading) platform; and remittance services. Similar to Luno, Belfrics 
provides custodial wallet services; and ensure that user and member identity information is 
provided and verified. 
 
Cryptocurrency exchanged by the members are transferred into an account that is controlled and 
managed by Belfrics; and all transactions are recorded on an internal ledger maintained by Belfrics. 
This means that Belfrics authenticates and verifies all transactions conducted through their 
exchange, which is different from how transactions are recorded on the Luno Exchange. Luno does 
not verify any transaction, but requires same to undertaken on a ledger held on a particular 
cryptocurrency exchange. 
 
2.2.3 BitPesa 
 
 In contrast to the services provided by BitPesa and in relation to the determination of the 
exchange rate, Luno clearly indicates that it does not determine the exchange rate, rather it is 
determined by agreement between the transacting users. Whereas, the Belfrics’ website is 
silent on who determines the exchange rate, BitPesa agrees on an exchange rate with the 
users. 
 
 All users intending to use BitPesa Services are required to accept and agree to conduct 
transactions and use services in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of Service.
112
 
Users are further required to register as users and provide verifiable identity information to 
BitPesa. In addition, the user must also provide verifiable identity information of third parties 
that they may conduct transactions with. 
 
 Users may conduct exchange or purchase transaction using BitPesa Services, which, in terms 
of the Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 respectively, occurs as follows: 
 
(a) Paragraph 2.3 provides for Exchange transactions conducted using BitPesa. In terms of 
Paragraph 2.3, to initiate an exchange transaction, the user needs to transfer cryptocurrency to 
his or her BitPesa account; agree with BitPesa on an exchange rate; designate a Payee account 
into which the National Currency is to be deposited; and confirm the Exchange transaction. 
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 If the user’s change transaction involves selling cryptocurrency for national currency, the 
customer is responsible for buying cryptocurrency from a third party. All transactions are 
subject to verification. 
 
 Once the exchange transaction is confirmed, the user has irrevocably authorised BitPesa to 
debit the designated amount of cryptocurrency from the user’s BitPesa account and the user 
may not cancel the Exchange Transactions. The corresponding amount of cryptocurrency 
debited from the user’s BitPesa account becomes the property of BitPesa. 
 
 Upon debiting the designated amount of cryptocurrency from the customer’s BitPesa account, 
BitPesa will deposit the designated amount of National Currency to the designated Payee 
account specified by the user. 
 
(b) Paragraph 2.4 provides for Purchase transactions conducted using BitPesa. In terms of 
Paragraph 2.4, to initiate a purchase transaction, the user needs to have sufficient funds in his 
or her bank account or mobile wallet account; agree on an exchange rate with BitPesa; 
designate a Payor account in to which the cryptocurrency is to be deposited; and confirm the 
purchase transaction. 
 
If the user uses a bank account, once the customer confirms a Purchase transaction, the user 
will either be required to transfer the use of the corresponding amount in the National 
Currency from the customer’s bank account or another payment instrument; the user 
irrevocably authorise BitPesa to debit the designated amount of National Currency from the 
valid bank account linked, and the user may not cancel the Purchase transaction. 
 
 BitPesa, in terms of Paragraph 3.7, 3.9 and 3.11 of its Terms and Conditions of Service, 
warns users against the risk of loss of holding cryptocurrency in their BitPesa accounts; the 
risk of change in law, which may adversely affect the use, transfer, exchange and value of 
cryptocurrency; and the risk of loss of private keys, which may result in the inability of the 
user to access their external cryptocurrency wallets and which may result in the permanent 
loss of cryptocurrency.   
 
 Insofar as it relates to the governing law applicable to the Terms and Conditions, Paragraph 
13.1 specifies the governing law as the Law of Luxembourg.  
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2.3 Potential risks that may affect cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and users 
 
 The most pertinent risk cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and users of services provided 
by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries can be susceptible to is the risk of an exchange 
breach.
113
 Other additional potential risks include money laundering risk, and liquidity and 
solvency risks. 
 
 In addition, the main risk that users are susceptible to is the risk of loss of cryptocurrency, 
through the aforementioned risks. In addition, users are further susceptible to loss of 
cryptocurrency through the risk of unauthorised use of private keys and therefore 
unauthorised transfer of users’ cryptocurrency; the risk of closure or shutdown of the 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary holding and storing users’ cryptocurrency private keys; 
insolvency of a cryptocurrency-based intermediary; and the risk of an administrator or 
employee absconding with users’ cryptocurrency. 
 
 The aforementioned risks to the cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and the users will be 
discussed below, in some cases with specific reference to examples of manifestation of such 
risks. 
 
2.3.1 Risks particular to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
 
 The provision of cryptocurrency-related activities and/or services exposes cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries to certain identifiable potential risks, which are discussed below. 
 
(a)  Exchange breach risk 
 
An exchange breach is defined as an event, during the life of an exchange, which result in the 
loss of users’ funds due to the negligence or misconduct by the operators of the exchange’.114 
Moore et al further identify four (4) scenarios that can lead to an exchange breach, namely 
security breach; data loss; insider scam; and legal action.
115
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 The risk of exchange breach may take various forms, namely security breach, data loss, 
insider scam or legal action, which may manifest in the following manner: 
 
(i) Security breach: A security breach is described as one where a malicious entity exploits the 
vulnerabilities in the exchange’s software, hardware or system configuration to steal 
cryptocurrency.  
 
 The manifestation of this type exchange breach risk can be illustrated by reference to that 
which has occurred with cryptocurrency-based intermediaries such as MtGox and other 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries mentioned below: 
 
(aa) MtGox 
  
 MtGox was launched in 2010 as a Tokyo based online marketplace and considered, at that 
time, the largest Bitcoin exchange.
116
 During the time of its operations, which was 2010 to 
2014, MtGox handled seventy (70) percent of Bitcoin transactions.
117
  
 
 As narrated by Zhou,
118
 on the MtGox site, a user was required to add a state-backed currency 
to his or her account, thereafter the user could directly buy Bitcoins from MtGox using money 
in the linked bank account.
119
 Despite the requirement of linking a bank account or PayPal 
account, the website facilitated exchanges in relative anonymity.
120
 
 On 07 February 2014, MtGox stopped all bitcoin withdrawals claiming that it was merely 
pausing withdrawal requests to obtain a clear technical view of the currency process.
121
 On 24 
February 2014, the exchange suspended all trading and the website went offline.
122
 On 25 
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February 2014, MtGox announced the disappearance of eight hundred and fifty (850 000) 
Bitcoin.
123
 
 
 During that same period, a leaked MtGox document indicated that hackers had raided the 
MtGox exchange and stole seven hundred and forty-four thousand (744 000) bitcoins 
belonging to MtGox customers, as well as and additional hundred thousand (100 000) 
bitcoins belonging to MtGox, resulting in MtGox being declared insolvent.
124
 On 28 February 
2014 MtGox filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan, and later in the United States of 
America.
125
 
 
 It is suspected that the first hack of MtGox occurred during June 2011 as a result of a 
compromised computer belonging to an auditor of MtGox.
126
 Norry states that, in this 
instance, the hacker(s) used their access to the exchange to artificially alter the nominal value 
of bitcoin to one cent and then transferred an estimated two thousand (2 000) bitcoin from 
customer accounts, which were sold.
127
 
 
 Norry provides that subsequent investigations had shown massive hacking of MtGox began as 
early as September 2011. As a result, MtGox was operating while technically insolvent for 
almost two (2) years and had practically lost all its bitcoin by mid-2013. Additional evidence 
suggested that MtGox was already missing eighty thousand (80 000) bitcoins even before 
2011.
128
 
 
 Although it remains unclear how exactly the hackers gained access and stolen the bitcoin 
from the MtGox wallets (both hot (online) or cold storage), Norry relays the following 
speculation:
129
 
 
 Hot storage: Prior to September 2011, the MtGox private key was encrypted and it would 
appear that it was stolen via a copied wallet.dat file, either by hacking or through an insider. 
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Once the file was hacked, the hacker(s) were able to access and cipher bitcoins gradually from 
wallets associated with MtGox’s private keys without the hack having being detected. 
 
 Cold storage: In respect to access to bitcoin held in the MtGox cold storage, theories ranges 
from suggestion that the storage may have been compromised by an individual with on-site 
storage access to suggestions that the cold storage coins were gradually deposited into the 
MtGox exchange system when a hot storage wallet ran low and that the lack of accountability 
among the staff meant that there was no awareness that wallets were being drained by 
hackers. 
 
 A Japanese Court has recently lifted MtGox out of bankruptcy, opening the door for one (1) 
billion US dollar worth of cryptocurrency to be paid to the MtGox former customers. This 
will allow the distribution of the remaining MtGox assets to ex-customers in the form that 
they seek, inclusive of bitcoin.
130
 
 
(bb) Bitfloor, a New York based exchange and trading platform, suffered a security breach when 
thieves gained access to the backups of the private keys controlling cash flow accounts on the 
exchange, and used this access to steal an estimated twenty-four thousand and eighty-six (24 
086) Bitcoins.
131
 The Bitfloor exchanges Bitcoin loss was estimated at two hundred and fifty-
one thousand six hundred (256 600) US Dollars at the time of the loss.
132
 
 
(cc) In August 2016, Bitfinex, a Hong Kong based cryptocurrency exchange, was hacked, 
suffering a loss of one hundred and nineteen thousand seven hundred and fifty-six (119 756) 
Bitcoin valued at sixty-eight (68) million US Dollars loss at the time.
133
 
 
(dd) In April 2018, the Korean police arrested the chief of Coinnest, a Korean cryptocurrency-
based exchange, for allegedly embezzling tens of millions of dollars from users’ accounts.134 
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(ee) In April and December 2017, Youbit, a South Korean cryptocurrency-based exchange, was 
hacked and had to file for bankruptcy after losing seventeen (17) percent of its assets during a 
second cyber attack.
135
 
 
(ff)  On 11 June 2018, Coinrail, a South Korean cryptocurrency-based exchange, was subject to 
hacking attack that resulted in the loss of various forms of cryptocurrency valued at forty (40) 
million US Dollars.
136
 
 
(gg) On 20 June 2018, Bithumb, a South Korean cryptocurrency-based exchange, announced that 
it suffered a hacking attack that resulted in the loss of Ripple valued at approximately thirty-
one (31) million US Dollars.
137
 
 
Investigations into most of the mentioned hackings found that the majority of cryptocurrency-based 
exchanges operated without adequate security measure and information technology 
infrastructure.
138
 
 
(ii) Data loss: Data loss may occur due to hardwire problems that can result in unrecoverable loss 
of cryptocurrency, for instance, Bitomat.pl lost user funds in a data loss caused by an 
improper server restart.
139
 
 
(iii) Insider scam: This occurs when unscrupulous exchange operators steal user funds.
140
 In 
April 2018, the Korean Police arrested the chief of Coinnest, a South Korean cryptocurrency-
based exchange, alleging that he embezzled tens of millions of dollars from customers’ 
accounts.
141
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(iv) Legal action: Legal action that can result in confiscation and subsequent loss of 
cryptocurrency.
142
  
 
(b) Other potential risks: Money laundering risk 
 
 The process of money laundering conducted through a cryptocurrency-based exchange 
encompasses the following: 
 
(i) The criminal purchases a basic cryptocurrency at cryptocurrency-based exchange, by often 
employing strawmen with clean records and corroborated employment;
143
 
 
(ii) Once the strawmen has been verified by the cryptocurrency-based exchange, fiat currency or 
bank transfers are used to purchase primary cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum or 
Litecoin; and primary cryptocurrency is then used to purchase altcoins
144
 from an advanced 
cryptocurrency-based exchange.
145
 Altcoins have particular specifications, some of which are 
privacy cryptocurrency offering an elevated level of anonymity.
146
 
 
(iii) In order to obscure the primary cryptocurrency’s audit trail, money launderers use a tactic 
referred to as mixing or tumbling, which involves the use of mixing services such Bitmixer or 
Helix to swap primary cryptocurrency addresses for temporary digital wallet addresses to fool 
the blockchain and to break audit traceability.
147
 
(iv) The money launderers layer multiple privacy cryptocurrency (altcoins), cryptocurrency-based 
exchanges and cryptocurrency addresses to sever the audit trail, effectively preparing illicit 
funds by cleansing them for integration into the traditional financial system.
148
 
 
(v) having severed the audit trail, the money launderer has several options for withdrawing 
cleansed funds from cryptocurrency to obtain fiat currency, namely by exchanging privacy 
cryptocurrency for primary cryptocurrency, and thereafter exchanging primary 
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cryptocurrency for fiat currency which can be withdrawn; or transfer the storage of 
cryptocurrency from an online (hot) wallet storage to offline (cold) wallet storage
149
, which 
can be transported anywhere in the world.
150
 
 
 An investigation conducted by the Wall Street Journal alleged that over forty-six (46) 
cryptocurrency-based exchanges assisted criminals in laundering more than USD 88 million 
since 2016. Examples of such alleged cryptocurrency-based exchanges include ShapeShift 
AG, an altcoin cryptocurrency-based exchange.
151
 
 
 The Wall Street Journal Report presented evidence from security researchers alleging that 
criminals used ShapeShift to exchange Bitcoin for Monero, an anonymity centric 
cryptocurrency.
152
 
  
The risks mentioned in this sub-paragraph will collectively be referred to as the ‘cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries’ related risks’ in this research. 
 
2.3.2 Risks particular to users 
 
 Users using cryptocurrency-based intermediary services are susceptible to the following risks: 
 
(a) the risk of loss of cryptocurrency due to the risks discussed under Paragraph 2.3.1 above; 
 
(b) the risk of unauthorised use of user cryptocurrency where the user has ceded the control of the 
cryptocurrency private key to the cryptocurrency wallet provider as is the case with Luno;  
 
(c) the risk of closure of cryptocurrency-based intermediary and shut down of website, which 
results in the inability to access cryptocurrency held by the cryptocurrency-based 
intermediary;
153
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(iv)  the risk that user may not be reimbursed for the losses on account of the aforementioned risks, 
including those affecting the cryptocurrency-based intermediary; and 
 
(vii) the risk of loss when the cryptocurrency exchange becomes insolvent or when a 
cryptocurrency wallet provider absconds with the users’ cryptocurrency.154 
 
The risks mentioned in this sub-paragraph will collectively be referred to as ‘user related risks’ in 
this research. 
 
Therefore, the most prominent risk that cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are susceptible to is 
the risk of security breach through hacking, and this same risk results in significant losses to the 
users. 
 
Furthermore, the three cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, namely Luno, Belfrica and BitPesa 
referred to in Paragraph 2.2, and any other cryptocurrency-based intermediaries operating within 
Africa, are similarly susceptible to the risks identified in Paragraph 2.3 above. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided a basic overview of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries by making 
reference to the types of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; the activities they conduct and the 
services they provide; the risks that they are susceptible to; and the risks that my materialise for 
users using such services. 
 
In providing this overview, this chapter further provided insight into various categories of 
cryptocurrency-based exchanges, namely centralised and decentralised cryptocurrency-based 
exchanges; and various types of cryptocurrency wallet storage categories, namely custodial and 
non-custodial wallets. 
 
In addition, and as an illustration, this chapter explored the terms of use (in the case of Luno) or 
terms of condition (in the case of Belfrics and BitPesa) of selected cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries operating within South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. 
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This chapter further identified, amongst other listed, that the materialisation of the risk of security 
breach is the most prominent risk to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; and the risk of loss 
through the actions of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries the most prominent risk to users.  
 
The potential risks identified in this chapter necessitate the need for a regulatory legal framework 
aimed at the detection, monitoring and mitigation of such potential risks with the objective of 
ensuring secure provision of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ activities and/or services; and to 
achieve user protection. 
 
Chapter three will then examine, analyse and determine whether existing legislation regulating 
conventional financial intermediaries apply to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and whether 
such legislation will be suitable to address the risks identified in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
REGULATION OF CONVENTIONAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF TO CRYPTOCURRENCY-BASED 
INTERMEDIARIES: A CASE OF SOUTH AFRICAN, NIGERIAN AND 
KENYAN LAW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Before designing a cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulatory legal framework, it is pertinent 
to provide some understanding of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and to identify the risk that 
may materialise from the use of such services and the conduct of such services, which was done in 
chapter two. 
 
It is further pertinent to analyse and examine existing legislation regulating and supervising 
institutions or actors that conduct similar and/or comparable activities or services, such as 
conventional financial intermediaries. These analysis and examination is aimed at determining 
whether such existing legislation is applicable to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; and/or 
suitable to address cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ related risks identified in chapter two.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, existing legislation regulating and supervising conventional 
financial intermediaries within Africa, more particularly, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya will be 
examined. 
 
This chapter will therefore identify and discuss existing legislation regulating conventional financial 
intermediaries in general, if any; and specifically, regulating financial institutions, financial services 
and product providers; conventional exchanges; and conventional remittance or money transfer 
service providers. In each instance of the analysis and examination of existing legislation, the 
applicability of such legislation of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries will be canvassed.  
 
In addition, this chapter will examine the suitability of existing legislation identified and discussed 
herein to regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; and cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ 
and users’ risk. 
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3.1 Conventional Financial Intermediaries 
 
 Conventional financial intermediaries act as middlemen
155
 and matchmakers
156
 that facilitate 
trade within the conventional financial market with the general purpose of effectuating more 
efficient transactions.
157
  
 
 In comparison to conventional financial intermediaries, and as is postulated in chapter two, 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries provide similar matchmaking services; act as 
middlemen; and further aim to effectuate and facilitate efficient transactions within the 
cryptocurrency market.  
 
 Conventional financial intermediaries provide services that include taking deposits from the 
general public and safeguarding such deposits;
158
 exchanging currency (national and/or 
foreign) for other currency (national and/or foreign);
159
 and remittance transfer services aimed 
at facilitating and guaranteeing the flow of money from a sender to a recipient.
160
 
 
The provision of the aforementioned services requires compliance with regulatory and 
supervisory legislation in the selected African jurisdictions, as is pointed out below. 
 
 It is pertinent to point out that South Africa is the only jurisdiction, from the selected African 
countries, that has legislation specifically aimed at regulating advisory and intermediary 
services within the financial sector.  
 
 However, reference to conventional financial intermediary, for the purpose of this discussion, 
will include deposit-taking because of its similarity to cryptocurrency wallet services; 
conventional money remittance services because of its similarity to cryptocurrency-based 
remittance services; and conventional currency exchanges because of its similarity to 
cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
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 Therefore, all regulatory legislation governing the aforementioned services within South 
Africa, Nigeria and Kenya will be discussed in the sequence of cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries, including a discussion of deposit-taking; banking; financial service and 
products provision; money remittance services; and currency exchanges.  
 
3.2 Legislation governing conventional financial intermediaries and the application thereof 
to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries  
 
 This section discusses existing legislation regulating and supervising conventional financial 
intermediaries; and services and products they provide within South Africa, Nigeria and 
Kenya.  
 
3.2.1 South Africa 
 
 Financial intermediaries, banking institutions, financial products and services providers are 
governed by three different pieces of legislation in South Africa, namely the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002; the Banks Act 94 of 1990; and the 
Financial Services Regulator Act 9 of 2017.
161
 
 
(a) Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 (FAIS Act, 2002) (as 
amended by the Financial Services Regulation Act 9 of 2017) 
 
 The FAIS Act, 2002 is aimed at, amongst other things, the regulation relating to the rendering 
of certain financial advisory and intermediary services to clients.  
 
 The FAIS Act, 2002 requires financial services providers and their representatives to obtain a 
licence before acting or offering to act as a financial services provider.
162
 The FAIS Act, 2002 
further requires financial services providers and their representatives to comply with fit and 
proper requirements issued under section 6A of the FAIS Act, 2002. 
 
                                                 
161
 This research takes cognisance of the fact that some parts of the FSR Act, 2017, although passed, are still not in 
operation at this point in time. 
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 It defines a ‘financial service provider’ as any person that gives advice in respect of financial 
products and/or provides intermediary services, as a regular feature of the business of such a 
person.
163
 
 
 The FAIS Act, 2002 further provides that a financial product includes the products that are 
offered or serviced by a financial services provider. Examples of such products include 
shares, debentures, money-market instruments, insurance, benefits provided by pension funds 
and friendly societies and deposits (as defined by the Banks Act, 1990).
164
 
 
 The term “advice” encompasses any recommendation, guidance or proposal of a financial 
nature provided to any client, specifically, in relation to the purchase or investment of any 
financial product; or incurring of any liability or the acquisition of any right or benefit in 
respect of any financial product; or on the variation of any term or condition applying to a 
financial product, on the replacement of any such product, or on the termination of any 
purchase of or investment in any such product.
165
 
 
 The term “intermediary service” refers to an instance where a person does not provide advice, 
but performs any other act on behalf of a client, product or supplier.
166
 The intermediary 
facilitates the administration of the transaction that relates to the financial product, whereas 
advisory services refer to the facilitation of the client’s decision in respect of the financial 
product.
167
  
 
 Conducting financial products or services without the necessary authorisation in terms of 
section 7 of the FAIS Act, 2002 constitutes an offence in terms of section 36(1) of the FAIS 
Act, 2002 and any person doing so will, on conviction be liable to a fine or imprisonment or 
both a fine and imprisonment. 
 
 The determination whether the FAIS Act, 2002 applies to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries depends on whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries provide advice; an 
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intermediary service; or is a financial service provider as contemplated by the FAIS Act, 
2002. 
 
 The FAIS Act defines all the aforementioned terms in relation or relative to a financial 
product. The FAIS Act provides a comprehensive list of that which entails a financial 
product,
168
 none of which includes cryptocurrency or the act of trading in cryptocurrency
169
 as 
postulated in chapter one. 
 
 A financial service provider is perceived as one who provides advice and/or an intermediary 
service in relation to a financial product, which then results in the same conclusion, that is, 
that cryptocurrency or the act of trading in cryptocurrency does not satisfy the list provided in 
the definition of ‘financial product’. 
 
Therefore, cryptocurrency-based intermediaries do not provide financial services or intermediary 
services or any advice in relation to financial products as contemplated by the FIAS Act, 2002. 
Cryptocurrency or the act of trading in cryptocurrency can also not be considered as a financial 
product as contemplated by the FIAS Act, 2002. Therefore, the FIAS Act, 2002 does not apply to 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
(b) Financial Services Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (‘FSR Act, 2017’) 
 
 The purpose of the FSR Act, 2017 is to, amongst others, regulate and supervise financial 
product providers and financial services providers; to preserve and enhance financial stability; 
to improve market conduct in order to protect financial consumers; to provide for making 
regulatory instruments including prudential standards, conduct standards and joint standards; 
and to provide for a licensing regime.
170
 
 
 Section 2 provides a similar definition of ‘financial product’ as the FAIS Act, 2002, with the 
addition that ‘any facility or arrangement may be designated as a financial product’. 
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 In terms of section 2(2), any facility or arrangement may, through Regulations, be designated 
as a financial product, provided that it is not regulated by any other financial sector law, and 
if, doing so would advance the object of the FSR Act;
171
 and the facility or arrangement is the 
one through which, or through the acquisition of which a person conducts lending; makes a 
financial investment and manages financial risk. 
 
 In terms of section 3, a financial service refers to any activity conducted in South Africa in 
relation to a financial product, foreign financial product, a financial instrument or a foreign 
financial instrument. In terms of section 3, these activities ranges from offering, promoting, 
marketing or distributing; providing advice, recommendations or guidance; operating or 
managing; payment services; intermediary services as defined by the FAIS Act, 2002; to 
services relating to the buying and selling of foreign exchange.  
 
 The FSR Act, 2017 defines a financial product provider and financial service provider as a 
person that, as a business, provides a financial product or service, respectively. 
 
 Furthermore, section 111 of the FSR Act, 2017, requires that any person providing financial 
services, financial products and foreign financial products must attain a licence before 
providing such product or services. 
 
 In addition and in terms of section 266 of the FSR Act, 2017, any person who conducts a 
financial service or a financial product without obtaining a licence in terms of the section 111 
of the FSR Act, 2017 commits an offence and is, upon conviction, guilty of a fine or 
imprisonment or both a fine and imprisonment. 
 
 The determination whether the FSR Act, 2017 applies to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
depends on whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries provide a financial product or 
financial service; or whether cryptocurrency can be designated as a financial product, as 
contemplated by the FSR Act, 2017. 
 
 
 
                                                 
171
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(i) Whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are financial products providers as 
contemplated by the FSR Act, 2017? 
 
 The FSR Act, 2017 defines a financial product provider as a person that provides financial 
products. The FSR Act, 2017 defines a financial product in a similar manner as the FAIS Act, 
2002.  
 
 Therefore, it is trite to conclude that cryptocurrency-based intermediaries do not provide a 
financial product, unless ‘cryptocurrency’ or the ‘act of trading in cryptocurrency’ is 
designated as a financial product in terms of section 3 of the FSR Act, 2017. 
 
(ii) Whether cryptocurrency or the act of trading in cryptocurrency can be designated as a 
financial product as contemplated by the FSR Act, 2017? 
 
 Any facility or arrangement can be designated as a financial product provided that it is not 
regulated by another financial sector law; and if such designation is aimed at achieving the 
objects of the FSR Act, 2017, and such facility or arrangement serves as a conduit through, 
which a person conducts lending, makes a financial investment and manages financial risk.  
 
 The FSR Act, 2017 however, does not define ‘a facility’ or ‘an arrangement’, neither does it 
provide any direction regarding the form such facility or arrangement can take. Whether 
cryptocurrency or the act of trading in cryptocurrency can be designated as a financial product 
would depend on whether it complies with the aforementioned requirements.  
 
(iii)  Whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are financial service providers as 
contemplated by the FSR Act, 2017? 
 
 A financial service provider is one that provides a financial service. A financial service is any 
activity conducted in relation to a financial product. Therefore, for cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries to provide a financial service, they must be engaged in an activity that relates 
to a financial product. It was previously concluded that cryptocurrency or the act of trading in 
cryptocurrency is not a financial product, and the same conclusion applies in this instance. 
 
 In addition, any cryptocurrency-related services conducted by cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries will not qualify as the provision of a financial service, and therefore 
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cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are not financial service providers as contemplated by 
the FSR Act, 2017. 
 
Therefore, the FSR Act, 2017 does not apply to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, unless 
cryptocurrency or the act of trading in cryptocurrency are designated as financial products, which is 
not the case currently. 
  
(c) Banks Act 94 of 1990 (‘Banks Act, 1990’) (as amended by the FSR Act) 
 
 The purpose of the Banks Act, 1990 is to provide for the regulation and supervision of the 
business of public companies taking deposits from the public.
172
  
 
 The Banks Act, 1990 defines a ‘bank’ as “a public company registered as a bank in terms of 
the Banks Act. Furthermore, section 13(2) requires a bank to be incorporated as a public 
company in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008”;173  and the business of a bank as 
encompassing, amongst other things, acceptance of deposits from the general public as a 
regular feature of business in question”,174 including any activity that may be designated as 
the business of a bank by the Registrar after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank;
175
  
 
 In addition, the Banks Act, 1990 defines a ‘deposit’ as an amount paid by the depositor to the 
bank subject to an agreement in terms of which the amount or part thereof is repayable, 
conditionally or unconditionally, on a date, specified or unspecified or under circumstances 
agreed upon; and no interest is payable by the bank.
176
 
 
 Section 11 provides that no person can conduct the business of banking unless such a person 
is a public company and registers as a bank before conducting the business of a bank. In 
addition, a person intending to conduct the business of banking is required to seek 
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authorisation to, first, establish a bank;
177
 and secondly, to apply for registration to conduct 
the business of banking.
178
  
 
 The determination whether the Banks Act, 1990 applies to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and the taking into custody of cryptocurrency wallets depends on whether 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are banks or provide the business of a bank; or taking 
custody of cryptocurrency wallet is a deposit, as contemplated by the Banks Act, 1990. 
  
 The question that needs to be considered is whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries take 
deposits from the general public as regular feature of business and thus provide the business 
of a bank as contemplated by the Banks Act, 1990? This question requires the following 
questions: 
 
(i) Whether the act of taking custody of cryptocurrency wallets can be considered as 
deposits as contemplated by the Banks Act, 1990? 
 
 A deposit is considered as an amount paid by the depositor to the depository based on 
agreement, repaid conditionally or unconditionally by the depository to the depositor.  
 
 As is illustrated by Paragraph 13 of Luno’s Terms of Use179 referred to in chapter two, the 
user transfers ownership of his/her/its cryptocurrency wallet to Luno who then retains full 
ownership and control of the private keys associated with the user’s Luno account. Paragraph 
13 further provides that the user has no control of, or access to, or the ability to use such 
private keys. 
 
 In contrast, and as previously indicated in chapter two,
180
 a bank, although retaining control  
and ownership over the deposit, is required to repay such a deposit to the depositor when the 
depositor so requires. Furthermore, the depositor has access to the deposit at any time and can 
effect payment to a third party on the depositor’s instruction. 
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 The relationship between Luno and its user is contractual and no amount or something 
resembling an amount is kept in the cryptocurrency wallet. The cryptocurrency wallet 
contains access keys, but does not contain any currency or money, which is generally 
denominated in a certain amount. 
 
 Therefore, the taking into custody by the cryptocurrency-based intermediary and the deposit 
taking activities are different and cannot be perceived as similar conduct by these types of 
intermediaries. 
 
 In light of the aforementioned analysis alone, a cryptocurrency wallet is not a deposit and 
taking custody of a cryptocurrency wallet by the cryptocurrency-based intermediaries does 
not amount to taking a deposit as contemplated by the Banks Act, 1990. 
 
(ii) Whether the acceptance of a deposit of local currency by a cryptocurrency-based 
intermediary be considered as a deposit in terms of the Banks Act, 1990? 
 
 Luno permits users to deposit national currency into an account identified by Luno for the 
purchase of cryptocurrency. The users are only permitted to use such local currency deposits 
for the purchase of cryptocurrency or withdrawal to the users’ bank accounts, but for no other 
purpose.
181
  
  
 However, despite the aforementioned, it is pertinent to examine the acceptance of local 
currency by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries against the definition of ‘deposit’ in the 
Banks Act, 1990. 
 
 The Banks Act, 1990 requires a deposit to be made from one person to another, based on 
contract and repayable conditionally or unconditionally on a specified or unspecified date. 
The Banks Act, 1990 provides a definition of the term ‘deposit’ to qualify the conduct of the 
business of a bank. 
 
 Therefore, whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries accept deposits, insofar as it relates 
to the local currency, cannot be determined solely on the elements of the definition of a 
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‘deposit’, but must be considered in the context of conducting ‘the business of a bank’ as is 
done in Paragraph (cc) below. 
 
(iii) Whether the cryptocurrency-based intermediary take deposits as a regular feature of 
business and therefore, conduct the business of banking as contemplated by the Banks 
Act, 1990? 
 
 Considering the discussion undertaken and conclusion reached in Paragraph (bb), the question 
whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries conducts the business of a bank warrants further 
consideration. 
 
 The business of a bank requires acceptance of deposits from the general public as a regular 
feature of business.
182
 In addition, the definition of the term ‘business of a bank’ further 
provides that a person conducting the business of a bank must also solicit or advertise for 
deposits; use moneys received as deposits for granting of loans to others; invest such moneys; 
or finance business activities.
183
 
 
 In addition, the definition excludes the acceptance of a deposit by any person that does not 
purport to accept deposits on a regular basis; and who has not advertised for or solicited such 
deposits, provided that such a person does not hold deposits of more than twenty (20) persons 
or deposits amounting to more than R 500 000.
184
  
 
 There is no indication that Luno or any other cryptocurrency-based intermediary accepts 
deposits from the general public but rather from its users/customers/members; or does it 
accept the deposits as a regular feature of business. Furthermore, neither Luno nor any other 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary advertises for or solicits deposits.  
 
 The Banks Act, 1990 does not apply to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, neither does the 
holding in custody of cryptocurrency wallets nor the local currency accepted as deposit 
qualify as a deposit as contemplated by the Banks Act, 1990. 
 
                                                 
182
 In terms of the Registrar of Banks v Net Income Solutions and three (3) others (3056/13) [2013] ZAWCHC [40] 
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183
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In light of the aforementioned, none of the legislation discussed above governing conventional 
financial intermediaries in South Africa can be applied to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, 
neither can taking into custody of cryptocurrency wallets be considered as deposit-taking. 
 
3.2.2 Nigeria 
 
 Banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria are regulated by the Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions Act Cap B3, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (as amended) (‘BOFI 
Act, 2004’). The purpose of the BOFI Act, 2004 is to regulate banking and other financial 
institutions.
185
  
 
 Section 1(5)(a) provides that a person is deemed to receive money as a deposit if the person 
accepts deposits from the general public as a regular feature of business or if it issues and 
advertisement or solicits for such deposits. Section 1(5)(b) further provides that deposits must  
be money received in fixed amounts, repayable either conditionally or unconditionally on a 
specified or unspecified date. 
 
 In terms of section 2(1) only a person that is a company incorporated in Nigeria and holds a 
valid banking licence can conduct banking business in Nigeria. The BOFI Act, 2004 defines a 
‘banking business’ as a business that receives deposits; or provides financing; or conducts any 
other business as may be determined.
186
 
 
 In addition, Part II, more particularly section 58(1), provides only insurance and stockbroking 
activities can be carried on in Nigeria as other financial business except if such financial 
business is a company duly incorporated in Nigeria and holds a valid licence.
187
 
 
 In terms of section 2(2) an section 59(6) of the BOFI Act, 1991, any person conducting a 
business or financial business without obtaining a valid licence is guilty of an offence, and 
will, upon conviction, be liable to a fine or imprisonment or both a fine and imprisonment. 
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 The determination whether the BOFI Act, 2004 applies to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and the taking into custody of cryptocurrency wallets depends on the following 
questions:  
 
(a) Whether the act of taking custody of cryptocurrency wallets can be considered as 
deposits as contemplated by the BOFI Act, 2004? 
 
 The analysis undertaken and the conclusion reached under Paragraph 3.2.1(c) above regarding 
the same question in relation to the South African Banks Act, 1990 equally applies in the 
instance of a deposit as contemplated in the BOFI Act, 2004. The taking into custody of 
cryptocurrency wallets by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries does not constitute deposit 
taking or a deposit as contemplated by the Banking Act. 
 
(b) Whether the acceptance of local currency as deposits by cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries qualify as deposits in terms of the BOFI Act, 2004? 
 
 The acceptance of deposit of local currency by a cryptocurrency-based intermediary (as is the 
case of Luno, which also operates in Nigeria) does not qualify as a deposit as contemplated by 
the BOFI Act, 2004, because first, the local currency is not received from the general public 
but from members/users/customers of the cryptocurrency-based intermediary.  
 
 Secondly, the deposit of local currency accepted by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries is to 
fund the potential purchase of cryptocurrency and not as a general feature of business. 
 
(c) Whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries conduct a banking business as 
contemplated by the BOFI Act, 2004? 
 
 The receiving of deposits; and the provision of financing are the only activities, unless 
additional activities are designated, that qualify as banking business in terms of the BOFI Act, 
2004. It is therefore trite to point out that cryptocurrency-based intermediaries neither receive 
deposits nor provide financing, or otherwise conduct any activity are designated as banking 
business.  
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(d) Whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries carry on activities as ‘other financial 
business’ as contemplated by the BOFI Act, 2004? 
 
 Considering that the BOFI Act, 2004 provides that only insurance and stockbroking activities 
are recognised as other financial business, and that cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
conduct neither of those activities, it is trite to conclude that cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries do not provide other financial business as contemplated in the BOFI Act, 2004.  
 
Therefore, the BOFI Act, 2004 does not apply to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, neither does 
keeping in custody of cryptocurrency-wallets qualify as deposits nor the local currency accepted in 
deposit by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries as contemplated by the BOFI Act, 2004. 
 
3.2.3 Kenya 
 
 The banking and financial institutions in Kenya are regulated by the Banking Act Cap 488 of 
1995 (“Banking Act, 1995”), the purpose of which is to regulate business of banking in 
Kenya.  
 
 The conducting of banking and financial business in Kenya requires a valid licence,
188
 which 
may be granted with or without conditions in terms section 5, and revoked in terms of section 
6. 
 
 A ‘bank’ means a company, which carries on, or proposes, to carry on, banking business in 
Kenya; and the ‘business and financial business’ means accepting from members of public 
money on deposit repayable on demand or at the expiry of a fixed period or after notice; and 
employing of money held on deposit.
189
 
   
 Furthermore, a ‘financial institution’ means a company, other than a bank, which carries on, 
or proposes to carry on, financial businesses and include any other company, which the 
Minister may declare to be a financial institution for the purpose of this Act.
190
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 Section 3(1) of the Banking Act. 
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 In terms of section 16(2), a ‘deposit’ is defined as “a sum of money paid on terms under 
which it will be repaid, with or without interest or a premium, and either on demand or at a 
time or in circumstances agreed by or on behalf of the person making the payment and the 
person receiving it”. 
 
 In terms of section 16(5) a business is a deposit-taking business if, in the course of the 
business money received by way of deposit is lent to others; or any other activity of the 
business is financed, wholly or to any material extent, out of the capital of or the interest on 
money received by way of deposit.  
 
 The determination whether the Banking Act, 1995 applies to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and the taking into custody of cryptocurrency wallets depends on the following 
questions: 
 
(a) Whether the act of taking custody of cryptocurrency wallets can be considered as 
deposits as contemplated by the Banking Act, 1995? 
 
 The analysis undertaken and the conclusion reached under Paragraphs 3.2.1(c) and 3.2.2(a) 
above regarding the same question in relation to the Banks Act, 1990 and BOFI Act, 2004 
equally applies in the instance of a deposit as contemplated in the Banking Act,1995. The 
taking into custody of cryptocurrency wallets by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries does 
not constitute deposit taking or a deposit as contemplated by the Banking Act, 1995. 
 
 It is additionally also prudent to conclude that as they do not accept deposits, cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries do conduct a deposit-taking business as contemplated by the Banking 
Act, 1995. 
 
(b) Whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries conduct banking and financial business 
as contemplated by the Banking Act, 1995? 
 
 In terms of the Banking Act, 1995, banking and financial institutions accept deposits. As 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries do not accept deposits as contemplated by the Banking 
Act, 1995, they do not conduct banking and financial business. 
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(c) Whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are financial institutions as contemplated 
by the Banking Act, 1995? 
 
 Cryptocurrency-based intermediaries do not conduct financial business, and therefore, are not 
financial institutions as contemplated by the Banking Act, 1995. 
 
Therefore, as cryptocurrency-based intermediaries do not take deposits nor conduct banking or 
financial institutions or can be considered as financial institutions as contemplated by the Banking 
Act, 1995 does not apply to the cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
  
3.3 Legislation governing conventional currency exchanges service providers and the 
application thereof to cryptocurrency-based currency exchanges 
 
 Conventional currency exchanges provides services that allow users to exchange one fiat 
(national) currency for another currency whilst subject to legislation that governs their 
services and operations within the currency exchange market. Similarly, and as chapter 2 
points out,
191
 cryptocurrency-based exchanges allow users to exchange cryptocurrency for 
other cryptocurrencies or fiat currency.  
 
 The only difference between the services provided by the conventional currency exchanges 
and cryptocurrency-based exchanges is that the former exchanges currency designated as 
‘legal tender;’192 and the latter exchanges currency not designated as legal tender with another 
that is designated as legal tender. 
 
 The conventional currency exchanges operate within a regulated environment and the 
discussion in this section will focus on the relevant legislation within South Africa, Nigeria 
and Kenya that regulate and supervise the conventional currency exchanges and the services 
they provide. In addition, this section will discuss whether such legislation applies to 
cryptocurrency-based currency exchanges. 
 
 
                                                 
191
 See Paragraph 2.1.1 of chapter two. 
192
 Currency designated as legal tender is currency designated or impressed by law as legal tender, which then means 
that a creditor cannot lawfully refuse payment in such a currency. See Chung JJ ‘Money as Simulacrum: The Legal 
Nature and Reality of Money’ 5 Hastings Business Law Journal (2009) 113. 
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3.3.1 South Africa 
 
 The exchange of foreign currency in South Africa are governed by the Currency and 
Exchange Control Act 9 of 1933 (the Currency and the Exchange Control Act, 1933) and 
Exchange Control Regulations, 1961 (the Exchange Control Regulations).
193
 The purpose of 
the Currency and Exchange Control Act, 1933 is to regulate legal tender, currency exchange 
and banking. 
 
 The exchange of foreign currency in South Africa is governed by the Currency and Exchange 
Control Act 9 of 1933 and the Exchange Control Regulations. Only an authorised dealer
194
 is 
permitted to buy, sell, send, consign or deliver foreign currency
195
. 
 
 In terms of Regulation 1, only an authorised dealer can deal in foreign currency, which refers 
to currency that is not legal tender in South Africa. The term ‘money’ further includes foreign 
currency, any bill of exchange or any negotiable instrument.  
 
 Therefore, to ascertain whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are currency exchanges 
as contemplated by the Currency and Exchange Control Act 9 of 1933 and the Exchange 
Control Regulations, it needs to be determined whether cryptocurrency is a foreign currency. 
Cryptocurrency-based exchanges allow the exchange of cryptocurrency for other 
cryptocurrency, and cryptocurrency does not qualify as foreign currency in terms of the 
Exchange Control Regulations.  
 
Therefore, neither the Currency and Exchange Control Act, 1993 nor the Exchange Control 
Regulations apply to the exchange services provided by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
in South Africa. 
 
 
 
                                                 
193
 As promulgated by Government Notice R.1111 of 1 December 1961 and amended up to Government Notice No. 
R.445 in Government Gazette No. 35430 of 8 June 2012.  
194
 The Exchange Control Regulations, Regulation 1, defines an ‘authorised dealer’ as, in respect of any transaction in 
respect of gold, a person authorised by the Treasury to deal in gold, and in respect of any transaction in respect of 
foreign exchange a person authorised by the Treasury to deal in foreign exchange.   
195
 The Exchange Control Regulations, in Regulation 1, define ‘foreign currency’ as any currency, which is not legal 
tender in the Republic, and includes any bill of exchange, letter of credit, money order, postal order, promissory note, 
traveller’s cheque or any other instruments for the payment of currency payable in a currency unit, which is not legal 
tender in the Republic. 
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3.3.2 Nigeria 
 
 The foreign currency exchanges in Nigeria are governed by the Foreign Exchange 
(Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Chapter F 34 (Decree No. 17 of 1995), the 
purpose of which is to establish an Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (the Market); and 
to provide for the monitoring and supervision of transactions conducted in the Market. 
  
 Section 41 of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, 
the Market means “a market in which authorised dealers, authorised buyers, foreign exchange 
end-users and the Central Bank of Nigeria are participants”. 
 
 Section 41 further states that an ‘authorised dealer’ refers to any bank licensed under the 
BOFI Act, 2004 and, which is issued with a licence to deal in foreign currency; and an 
‘authorised buyer’ refers to a bureau de change, a hotel or other corporate body appointed as 
such by the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
 
 Section 41 also defines a ‘foreign currency’ as currency other than Nigerian currency, 
designated as legal tender outside of Nigeria. 
 
 Section 1(1) provides that foreign exchange transactions must be conducted in the Market in 
accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1995; and in terms of Section 2(1), all transactions must be conducted in 
convertible foreign currency.  
 
 In terms of section 5(1) only an authorised dealer or buyer of foreign currency, which can 
either be a bank or a non-banking corporate organisation, showing evidence of sufficient 
resources and capacity, can operate within the Market. 
 
 Therefore, currency exchange transactions in Nigeria are conducted by Market participants 
within the Market established in terms of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and 
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995. The Market participants must be either authorised 
dealers or buyers; or foreign exchange end-users; or the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
  
 In order to ascertain whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries conduct currency exchange 
transactions as contemplated by the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous 
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Provisions) Act, 1995, it needs to be determined whether cryptocurrency is a foreign 
currency. Cryptocurrency-based exchanges allow the exchange of cryptocurrency for other 
cryptocurrency, and cryptocurrency does not qualify as foreign currency in terms of the 
Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995.  
 
 Therefore, considering that cryptocurrency-based exchanges conduct exchange transaction in 
cryptocurrency, the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995 
does not apply to cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
 
3.3.3 Kenya 
 
 Conventional currency exchanges in Kenya are governed by Part VIA of the Central Bank of 
Kenya Act 15 of 1966, which deals with the regulations of foreign exchange dealings. 
 
 In terms of section 33A(1), no person other than an authorised dealer, which includes an 
authorised bank; an authorised money remittance provider; an authorised micro-finance bank; 
or an authorised bureau,
196
 is permitted to conduct a foreign exchange business; and in terms 
of section 33B(1), any person conducting a foreign exchange business must acquire a licence. 
 
 In terms of section 2 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966 ‘currency’ refers to Kenyan 
currency; ‘foreign currency’ refers to currency other than Kenyan currency, which has been 
declared as legal tender in any territory outside Kenya; and ‘a foreign exchange bureau’ refers 
to a company incorporated in Kenya with the main object of buying and selling foreign 
currency. 
 
 Section 2 also defines ‘a foreign exchange business’ as a business that conducts activities of 
buying, selling, borrowing or lending foreign currency; or any other business involving 
transactions in foreign currency; and the settling of payments to or from Kenya or in Kenya 
between residents and non-residents. 
 
 In order to ascertain whether cryptocurrency-based intermediaries conduct foreign currency 
exchange business as contemplated by the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966, it needs to be 
determined whether cryptocurrency is a foreign currency. Cryptocurrency-based exchanges 
                                                 
196
 Section 2 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966. 
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allow the exchange of cryptocurrency for other cryptocurrency, and cryptocurrency does not 
qualify as foreign currency in terms of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966. 
 
 Cryptocurrency-based exchanges are not foreign exchange businesses as they do not conduct 
activities of buying, selling, borrowing or lending foreign currency as contemplated by Part 
VIA of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966. In fact, they do not conduct any activities 
related to foreign currency. Therefore, the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966 does not apply to 
cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
 
The aforementioned legislation is the only legislation that regulates and supervises currency 
exchange in the selected jurisdictions.  
 
As noted in Paragraph 2.1.1
197
 and Paragraph 2.2
198
 of chapter 2, cryptocurrency-based exchanges 
act much like conventional currency exchanges, the only difference being that the former exchanges 
cryptocurrency for local currency designated as legal tender in the jurisdictions they operate, for 
instance cryptocurrency for the South African Rand if the cryptocurrency-based exchange operates 
within South Africa.  
 
However, although cryptocurrency-based exchanges provide the service of exchanging 
cryptocurrency for fiat currency or vice versa, the legislation discussed only recognizes the 
exchange of one fiat currency for another, for instance South African Rand for United States Dollar, 
and therefore considering such legislation, the currency exchange services provided by 
cryptocurrency-based exchanges do not qualify as foreign exchange services. 
 
3.4 Legislation governing conventional money remittance service providers and the 
application thereof to cryptocurrency-based remittance service providers 
 
 Conventional money remittances assume the form of cash or credit transfers and transfers in 
kind (involving transfers of goods).
 199
 Cash transfers are sent in either the foreign currency or 
the local currency by means of physical transfer of cash. Credit transfers are based on 
                                                 
197
 Paragraph 2.1.1 of chapter two discusses cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
198
 Paragraph 2.2 of the chapter two provides examples of selected cryptocurrency-based intermediaries in South 
Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. 
199
 IMF International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users (2009) 6-7 (‘IMF (2009)’).  
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payment instructions from providers in the sending country to providers in the receiving 
country.
200
  
 
 In contrast, and as postulated in Paragraph 2.1.3 of chapter two, cryptocurrency-based 
remittance remittances transfer cryptocurrency instead of money (whether cash or credit). 
 
 This section analysis and examines legislation regulating and supervising conventional money 
remittances service provision in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya.  
 
3.4.1 South Africa 
  
 South Africa does not have legislation that specifically regulates conventional remittance 
services provision or remittance service providers, however the Exchange Control 
Regulations control the taking and sending of South African Rand in or out of South Africa as 
pointed out below. 
 
 In terms of Regulation 3(1)(bbis), only a person granted permission by the Treasury or a 
person authorised by the Treasury may, amongst other things, take or send any South African 
Rand in or out of South Africa; or in terms of Regulation 3(1)(c), make any payment, to, or in 
favour, or on behalf of a person resident outside South Africa, or any sum to the credit of such 
person. 
 
 As remittance service providers receive South African Rand for transmission out of South 
Africa or facilitate payment to a person resident outside South Africa, the aforementioned 
sub-Regulations become relevant to their operations, which means, remittance service 
providers require permission from the Treasury or from a person authorised by the Treasury. 
 
 Cryptocurrency-based remittance services do not remit local currency, but receive 
cryptocurrency from the sender and remit such cryptocurrency to the recipient, who then 
receives local currency from a cryptocurrency-based remittance service provider. 
 
                                                 
200
 IMF (2009) 6-7.  
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 Therefore, although providing remittance services, the cryptocurrency-based remittance 
service providers do not remit any national currency, but rather cryptocurrency, which is not 
recognised as foreign currency
201
 or legal tender. 
 
3.4.2 Nigeria 
 
 A letter dated 26 September 2014 and issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria contains the 
Guidelines for the Operation of International Transfer Services in Nigeria issued by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (the 2014 Guidelines)
202
.  
 
 The aforementioned letter is addressed to the members of the public, authorised dealers and 
money transmission service operators advising them to operate within the ambit of the 2014 
Guidelines. 
 
 The 2014 Guidelines address business rules governing the operation of international money 
transfer services in Nigeria. In addition, it sets the basis for the regulation of services offered 
at different levels and by diverse participants.
203
 
 
 The following paragraphs of the 2014 Guidelines are relevant to this discussion: 
 
(a) Paragraph 9 of the 2014 Guidelines defines a ‘money transfer operator’ as an international 
money transfer service operator that is incorporated in Nigeria; a ‘transaction’ as a transfer 
sent or a transfer received as the case may be; and a ‘transfer amount’ as funds collected from 
the sender for a transfer, excluding applicable fees; 
 
(b) Paragraph 2.1 of the 2014 Guidelines requires any person conducting international money 
transfer services to acquire a valid licence; and in terms of Paragraph 8.1 of the 2014 
Guidelines, any person conducting such services without a valid licence will be sanctioned 
and/or prosecuted in accordance with the BOFI Act, 2004; 
 
                                                 
201
 See definition of foreign currency under Paragraph 3.3.1(a) above. 
202
 Guidelines for the Operation of International Transfer Services in Nigeria issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria date 
26 September 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2014 Guidelines’). 
203
 Paragraph 1.2 of the 2014 Guidelines. 
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(c) Paragraph 3.6.4 of the 2014 Guidelines requires currency to be given to a money transfer 
operator for transfer out of Nigeria to be in the form of Naira, the Nigerian national currency; 
and in terms of Paragraph 4.3 of the 2014 Guidelines, money transfer operators must make 
payment to customers only in Naira;  
 
(d) Paragraph 3.12 of the 2014 Guidelines requires money transfer operators to comply with 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism in Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Regulations, 2013; and all other applicable laws and regulations;  
 
(e) Paragraph 4.1 of the 2014 Guidelines require the money transfer operator to disclose to its 
customers the details of the exchange rate; meaning of technical terms and acronyms used; 
and prevailing exchange rates at all times; and 
 
(f) Paragraph 5.1 of the 2014 Guidelines requires money transfer operators to set up a complaints 
management unit to resolve complaints or disputes submitted by its customers; and Paragraph 
6.1 of the 2014 Guidelines requires money transfer operators to request from customers some 
form of identification authentication before making use of their services. 
   
 Cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ transactions encompass the same as the transfer sent of 
funds or receiving funds as defined by the 2014 Guidelines. The terms defined in the 2014 
Guidelines postulate a form of service that indicate sending and receiving funds from a sender 
to a recipient using a money transfer operator subject to applicable legislation and regulations; 
and the 2014 Guidelines. 
 
 This is no difference in the services provided by cryptocurrency-based remittance service 
providers or those described in the 2014 Guidelines and provided by conventional money 
transfer operators in Nigeria, save for the fact that cryptocurrency-based remittance service 
providers receive cryptocurrency for transfer from a sender and give as payment to the 
recipient, in this case, Naira. 
 
 A person can only provide remittance services if such a person is licensed and should only 
transfer Naira. This means that cryptocurrency-based remittance service providers are in 
breach of the 2014 Guidelines by providing similar services and transferring an unrecognised 
currency. 
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 As the provision of money transfer services in Nigeria requires licensing and as 
cryptocurrency-based remittance service providers in Nigeria provide similar services as 
indicated in the 2014 Guidelines, it is correct to conclude that cryptocurrency-based 
remittance services are subject to 2014 Guidelines and the BOFI Act, 2004, but only as far as 
it relates to remittance service provision. 
 
3.4.3 Kenya 
 
 Part VIA of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966 and the Money Remittance Regulations, 
2013
204
 governs remittance service providers. 
 
 Section 2 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act,1966 provides the following definitions: 
 
(i) An ‘authorised remittance service provider’ should be a money remittance operator licensed 
to provide the business of money remittance; and a money remittance provider accepts 
monies for the purpose of transmitting it to persons resident within Kenya or another country; 
and 
 
(ii) A ‘money remittance operator’ is defined as a company incorporated in Kenya who main 
object consists of the acceptance of monies for the purpose of transmitting them to persons in 
Kenya or another country as prescribed by the Central Bank of Kenya by regulations. 
 
 Regulation 2 of the Money Remittance Regulations, 2013 further provides the following 
definitions: 
 
(iii) A ‘money remittance business’ means “a service for the transmission of money or any 
representation of monetary value without any payment account created in the name of the 
payer and the payee where the money is received for the sole purpose of transferring a 
corresponding amount to payee or to another payment service operator acting on behalf of the 
payee; or funds received on behalf of, and made available to the payee”; and 
 
(iv) A ‘money remittance operator’ means a person licensed to undertake money remittance 
business. 
                                                 
204
 Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 56 date 19 April 2013. 
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 The Money Remittance Regulations, 2013 further provides, in terms of Regulation 4, that 
conducting money remittance business requires incorporation as a limited liability company 
under the Companies Act; and licensing. 
 
 The issue of whether a cryptocurrency-based remittance service providers in Kenya provide 
money remittance services as contemplated by the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1996 and the 
Money Remittance Regulations, 2013 is considered in the case of Lipisha Consortium Limited 
and BitPesa Limited v Safaricom Limited
205
 (the BitPesa Case).  
 
 In this case the Court considered, amongst other things, whether the Second Petitioner 
(BitPesa Limited) was engaging in illegal activities by conducting remittance services, which 
services the Second Petitioner admitted to providing,
206
 without the approval of the Central 
Bank of Kenya.
207
 
 
 In terms of Paragraph 17 of the BitPesa Case, and according to the Respondent (Safarciom 
Limited), the Respondent had previously asked the Second Petitioner to obtain formal 
approval from the Central Bank of Kenya. The Central Bank of Kenya however declined to 
grant approval to the Second Petitioner. 
 
 When the Second Petitioner sought approval from the Central Bank of Kenya as a money 
remittance services provider, the Central Bank of Kenya declined to approve as the Second 
Petitioner dealt in bitcoin, and as long as the Second Petitioner dealt in bitcoin it could not use 
the word “money remittance” or “money transfer”. The Central Bank of Kenya further stated 
that it did not regulate cryptocurrency.
208
  
 
 In the Court’s preliminary view, when the Second Petitioner stated that it engaged in the 
business of accepting bitcoin from various countries of the world and exchanging it for local 
African currencies, including but not limited to the Kenyan Shilling, the Second Petitioner 
was engaged in money remittance business. The Court’s preliminary view was based on the 
                                                 
205
 Lipisha Consortium Limited and BitPesa Limited v Safaricom Limited [2015] eKLR available at 
https://www.kenyalaw.org (accessed 24 October 2018) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BitPesa Case’). 
206
 BitPesa Case Paragraph 33. 
207
 BitPesa Case Paragraphs 16 and 76. 
208
 BitPesa Case  Paragraph 76.  
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definition of “money remittance business”, more particularly the part of the definition 
referring to “or any representation of money value”.209 
 
 The Court thus, relying on the aforementioned part of the definition of “money remittance 
business”, concluded that bitcoin represented monetary value and therefore, is the only reason 
it can be exchanged for the Kenyan shilling.
210
 
 
 Therefore, the Kenyan Court has clearly concluded that cryptocurrency-based remittance 
service providers are providing money remittance business and therefore subject to the 
Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966 and the Money Remittance Regulations, 2013. 
 
3.5 Additional issues that require compliance by conventional financial intermediary and 
the application thereof to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
 
 For the purpose of this discussion, all conventional financial intermediaries must comply with 
anti-money laundering requirements; and consumer protection measures. For instance: 
 
3.5.1 Anti-money laundering 
 
 Money laundering is a process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal 
application of income, and disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.
211
  
 
 The prohibition and elimination of money laundering is addressed in South Africa, Nigeria 
and Kenya through the legislation that follows below: 
 
(a) In South Africa, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 criminalises money 
laundering; introduces measures to combat money laundering; provides for the prohibition of 
money laundering and for an obligation to report information.  
 
 Furthermore, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA, 2001) is aimed at 
imposing certain duties on institutions and other persons who might be used for money 
                                                 
209
 BitPesa Case Paragraph 78. 
210
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 President's Commission on Organised Crime, Interim Report to the President and Attorney-General The Cash 
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Laundering’ 2 (2007) 44 American Criminal Law Review 769 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Mann (2007)’). 
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laundering purposes, and the financing of terrorist and related activities; to provide for 
customer due diligence measures; and to provide for a risk based approach to client 
identification and verification.  
 
 In terms of the FICA, 2001, an accountable institution is precluded from establishing a 
business relationship or entering into a transaction with an anonymous client or a client with 
an apparent false identity or fictitious name;
212
 and to identify ad verify a client’s identity 
before entering into a business relationship or a single transaction.
213
 
 
(b) In Nigeria, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 25 of 2011 enhances the scope of money 
laundering offences and customer due diligence measures; imposes a duty to report 
international transfer of funds and securities exceeding a prescribed amount by indicating the 
nature and amount of the transfer, the name and addresses of the sender and receiver of the 
funds and securities;
214
 and requires identification and verification of the identity of a 
customer, to identify and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of a beneficial 
owner.
215
 
 
(c) In Kenya, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 9 of 2009 governs money 
laundering activities in Kenya, the purpose of which is to provide for the offence of money 
laundering and to introduce measures for the combating the offence; to provide for 
identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. 
 
 The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 9 of 2009 requires a reporting 
institution to monitor unusual, suspicious or large transactions; and if such transactions seem 
suspicious, to report the transactions;
216
 to take reasonable measures to satisfy itself of the 
true identity of any applicant seeking to enter into a business relationship with the reporting 
institution;
217
 and to establish and maintain customer records.
218
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The aforementioned legislation imposes requirements on conventional financial intermediaries to 
monitor suspicious activities and transaction; and they are further required to identify and verify the 
identities and sources of income of their customers. 
 
Cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are not under any obligation to disclose the identities of the 
users, neither are they obligated, under any law, to require their users to disclose their identities or 
the sources of their income. 
 
3.5.2 Consumer protection 
 
(a) In South Africa, legislation aimed at consumer protection within South Africa includes the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008; the FAIS Act, 2002; the FRS Act, 2017; and the Banks 
Act, 1990.  
 
 The Consumer Protection Act, 2008 regulates the provision of goods and services, inclusive 
of financial services,
219
 to consumers; and the FSR Act, 2017 is aimed at the improvement of 
market conduct in order to protect the financial consumer,
220
 which can be at a equivalent to 
or higher than the standard of protection afforded by the Consumer Protection Act, 2008
221
. 
 
(b) In Nigeria, the Consumer Protection Council Act Chapter Cap 25 of 2004 establishes the 
Consumer Protection Council (section 1(1)) to promote and protect the interest of the 
consumers over all products and services. 
 
(c) In Kenya, Article 46 of the Constitution of Kenya provides for consumer rights, which applies 
to all goods and services offered by public entities and private persons. In addition, the 
Consumer Protection Act 46 of 2012 provides for the protection of the consumer to prevent 
unfair trade practices in consumer transactions.  
 
The aforementioned legislation on consumer protection generally applies across all sectors, 
inclusive of the financial sector and covers all good and services. In South Africa, the FSR Act, 
2017 makes specific provision for the protection of the financial consumer.  
 
                                                 
219
 See definition of ‘service’ in section 1 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2002. 
220
 The FSR Act, 2017 defines a financial customer as “a person to, or for whom, a financial product, financial 
instrument or a financial service is provided”. 
221
 Section 85 of the FSR Act, 2017. 
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Needless to say, the general nature of application of the aforementioned consumer protection 
legislation extends the scope of application to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries as they provide 
services, irrespective of their nature, to their users. 
 
3.6 Suitability of existing legislation regulating conventional financial intermediaries to 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation 
 
 The suitability of the aforementioned legislation to regulate cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and their related risks lies in the effectiveness and adequacy of such legislation 
to regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, the service they provide and the activities 
they conduct; and to address their related risks. 
 
 As pointed out in chapter two, cryptocurrency related risks include the risk of exchange 
breach, which include security breach, data loss, insider scam, legal risk and money 
laundering risk. For the user of such cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, includes the risk of 
loss of cryptocurrency, the risk of closure and inability to access the website of 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary, the risk of irrevocable transactions and the inability to be 
reimbursed for losses suffered, the insolvency of the cryptocurrency-based exchange. 
 
 It is evident from the aforementioned that cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation 
requires regulation that addresses cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ risk in addition to 
rules and requirements relating to technical compliance. These essentially means that 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation require a risk-based and rules-based 
approach to regulation. 
 
 The risk-based and rules-based approaches encompass the following as pointed out by 
Nicholls:
222
  
 
3.6.1 The rules-based approach is referred to as the ‘traditional notion of regulation exerting public 
authority through a system of rules and laws in which the regulator ensures technical 
compliance by the regulated.
223
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 Nicholls A ‘The challenges and benefits of risk-based regulation in achieving scheme outcomes’ (Paper presented to 
the Actuaries Institute Schemes Seminar during 08 to 10 November 2015) 2 available at 
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Nicholls criticises this approach by noting that it is reactive, focused on enforcement and may 
miss critical emerging risks because regulators consider such falling ‘outside the scope 
regulation’.224 
 
3.6.2 The risk-based approach to regulation focuses on risks and harm prevention, the promotion of 
outcomes and to choose appropriate instruments to achieve performance.
 225
 
 
The legislation discussed in this chapter impose rules and regulations that require compliance 
by the regulated industry, for instance, the aforementioned legislation requires licensing or 
registration or authorisation before conducting the regulated activities;
226
 and imposes 
penalties for non-compliance.
227
 
 
Although the requirement of obtaining some form of authorisation to conduct regulated 
services and non-compliance with such a requirement results in penalties does not cause the 
aforementioned legislation unsuitable to regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, those 
rules and requirements on their own are unsuitable to address cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries’ related risks. 
 
Therefore, the legislation discussed in this chapter will not be suitable to regulate 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter explored and examined the applicability to and suitability of existing legislation 
regulating conventional financial intermediaries to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. In the 
former instance, this chapter determined that, save for the legislation governing consumer 
protection and the applicability of Kenyan money transfer laws by virtue of the Bitpesa case, is not 
applicable to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
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In the latter instance, this chapter determined that existing legislation discussed in this chapter will 
not be suitable to regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries as such legislation is rules-based 
instead of risk-based. It will therefore not address the risks identified in chapter two. 
 
Chapter four will discuss the rationale for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation; and the 
global regulatory responses to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries in order to explore the most 
suitable regulatory approach to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE RATIONALE FOR CRYPTOCURRENCY-BASED INTERMEDIARIES’ 
REGULATION AND GLOBAL REGULATORY RESPONSES TO 
CRYPTOCURRENCY-BASED INTERMEDIARIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Designing a cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulatory framework requires an understanding 
of the nature of cryptocurrency-based intermediation, services they provide and the risks their use 
may pose, as is pointed out in chapter two. This means that chapter two dispensed of the first sub-
objective of this research.
228
  
 
Furthermore, designing of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation further requires an 
analysis and determination of the applicability of existing legislation governing comparable or 
similar institutions, namely conventional financial intermediaries and/or intermediation and the 
services provided by such institutions, as is undertaken in chapter three.  
 
Chapter three concluded that current regulatory legislation applicable to conventional financial 
intermediaries, save for consumer protection, which is of a general application; and legislation 
regulating money transfer services within Kenya; is not applicable or suitable to regulate 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. This means that chapter three dispensed of the second and 
third sub-objectives of this research.
229
 
 
This chapter is aimed at addressing the third sub-objective, that is, to explore potential regulatory 
approaches to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, which will speak to the ultimate design of a 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulatory framework. 
 
Therefore, this chapter will first, explore the rationale for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ 
regulation; and secondly, examine current global regulatory responses to cryptocurrency and 
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229
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cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; and thirdly, identify, if possible, a suitable approach to 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation in Africa.  
 
The proposed regulation may take the form of self-regulation; or characterisation and/or integration 
of cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency-based intermediaries into existing legislation; or designing an 
entirely new cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulatory legal framework aimed at addressing 
the potential risks identified in chapter two. 
 
4.1 The rationale for regulation of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
 
 The rationale for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulations can be ascertained by the 
various potential risks identified in chapter two
230
 ranging from the need for user protection; 
prevention, detection and monitoring of cyber attacks, security breaches, insider scams; 
unauthorised use of users private key; to prevention, detection and monitoring of money 
laundering activities.  
 
 Therefore, any regulation of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries must be aimed at 
addressing, mitigating, controlling and monitoring the aforementioned potential risks; to 
achieve adequate user protection; to detect, deter and mitigate money laundering; and to 
contribute towards enhanced transparent and well-functioning cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries.
231
 
 
 Hughes and Middlebrook place the aforementioned rationale in three categories, namely 
regulation for public law purposes (user protection,
232
 anti-money laundering programs and 
conduct of business); regulation for private law purposes (governing the relationship between 
the cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and the user); and regulation aimed at the 
contribution toward transparency and well-functioning markets.
233
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 The regulation for public law purposes entails and includes regulatory rules aimed at the 
prevention, detection and deterrence of money laundering; or tax evasion
234
;
235
 the regulation 
for private law purposes includes establishment of default rules to govern the relationship 
between parties and defining the nature of such relationship;
236
 and the regulation towards 
enhancement of transparency and well-functioning markets may include licensing and 
registration before operating or conducting the licensable or registrable activities.
237
 
 
Therefore, the most suitable regulatory framework for cryptocurrency-based intermediation will be 
one that addresses all public and private issues, with emphasis on strong user-protection and a 
clarification of the relationship between users and cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; and 
transparency and accountability to enhance well-functioning cryptocurrency-based markets. 
 
Having taken cognisance of the aforementioned rationale for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ 
regulation, the section that follows below sets out the various regulatory approaches undertaken 
globally to address and regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
4.2 Global regulatory responses to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries  
 
 Various regulatory responses have been undertaken globally ranging from self-regulation to 
licensing to conduct cryptocurrency-related activities examples of which are indicated in this 
section. 
 
4.2.1 Prohibition or frustration of conducting cryptocurrency-based business: China and 
India 
 
 China prohibits the conduct of cryptocurrency-related business activities; and on the other 
hand, although not prohibiting such activities, India prohibits regulated entities, which 
excludes cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, from conducting or engaging in 
cryptocurrency-related business activities. Both China and India’s regulatory approaches are 
discussed below. 
 
 
                                                 
234
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(a) China 
 
 On 09 September 2017, seven (7) government agencies of China jointly issued a Public 
Notice entitled ‘Prevention of Risks of Token Offerings and Financing’ (the China Public 
Notice).
238
   
 
The China Public Notice prohibits any platform providing trading and exchange services from 
exchanging legal tender for virtual currencies; or from engaging in proprietary trading 
between legal tender and virtual currencies; or from providing price determination or 
information intermediary services for virtual currencies.
239
 
 
 The trading and exchange of virtual currencies for fiat and vice versa forms the basis of   the 
activities of a cryptocurrency-based exchange business; and by prohibiting such activities the 
Chinese Government essentially prohibits the cryptocurrency-based exchange business. 
 
(b) India 
 
 In terms of Circular RBI/2017-18/154 entitled ‘Prohibition on dealing in Virtual Currencies’ 
(the Indian Reserve Bank Circular) and dated 06 April 2018, the Indian Reserve Bank 
prohibits regulated entities from dealing in virtual currencies or providing services for 
facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling virtual currencies.
240
 
 
 The IRB Circular further describe the aforementioned services as including the maintenance 
of accounts, registering, trading, settling, clearing, giving loans against virtual currencies, 
accepting virtual currencies as collateral, opening accounts of exchanges dealing with virtual 
currencies, and transfer or receipt of money in accounts related to the sale or purchase of 
virtual currencies.
241
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 In addition, regulated entities already providing the aforementioned services are required to 
exit the relationship within three (3) months from the date of the IRB Circular.
242
 
 
 Despite the implications of the IRB circular, cryptocurrency-based intermediaries continue to 
operate within India, and due to the unregulated nature of cryptocurrency-based exchanges, 
some cryptocurrency-based exchanges operating within India are self-regulating, employing 
customer identification procedures and monitoring transactions of suspicious nature.
243
  
 
These cryptocurrency-based exchanges have even formed an association known as the 
‘Digital Assets and Blockchain Foundation’ working towards awareness and best industry 
practices.
244
 
 
 In comparison to China, which prohibits activities conducted by cryptocurrency-based 
exchanges and platforms, India simply cuts-off the means of trading of cryptocurrency-based 
exchanges without prohibiting the services provided by cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
 
 The India example is furthermore indicative of instances where the industry itself designs 
self-regulatory rules governing the industry. However, such self-regulatory rules are not 
legally binding, compliance is voluntary and there is no obligation on the industry or the 
entities operating within that industry to report suspicious activity. 
 
4.2.2 Application of existing legislation: Philippines, United States of America, Australia and 
Japan 
 
 The Philippines, United States of America, Australia and Japan apply existing legislation with 
necessary amendments to cryptocurrency-based exchanges. The Philippines and FinCen apply 
money transfer legislation; Australia applies legislation applicable to anti-money laundering; 
and Japan applies legislation applicable to payment systems. The aforementioned regulatory 
approaches are discussed below. 
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(a) Philippines 
  
 On 06 February 2017, the Philippines issued Circular No. 994 of 2017 entitled ‘Guidelines of 
Virtual Currency Exchanges’ (the Philippines Guidelines), which is incorporated as section 
4512N of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Banking Financial Institutions. 
 
 The Philippines Guidelines are aimed at regulating virtual currencies when used for delivery 
of financial services, more particularly for payment and remittances, which have a material 
impact on anti-money laundering, terrorist financing, consumer protection and financial 
stability.
245
 
 
The Philippines Guidelines apply to virtual currency exchanges offering services or engaging 
in activities that provide a facility for conversion or exchanges virtual currencies for fiat 
currencies and vice versa.
246
 
 
Sub-section 4512N.2 of the Philippines Guidelines provides, amongst other, the following 
definitions: 
 
(i) a ‘remittance or transfer company’ refers to any entity that provides money or value transfer 
services;  
 
(ii) a ‘money or value transfer service’ as a financial service that involves the acceptance of cash, 
cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of value and the payment of a 
corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary by means of a communication, 
message, a transfer or a clearing network; and 
 
(iii) a ‘virtual currency’ as any type of digital unit used as a medium of exchange or a form of 
digitally stored value. 
 
In terms of sub-section 4512N.3 of the Philippines Guidelines, any virtual currency exchange 
may only operate as a remittance or transfer company once it has obtained a Certificate of 
Registration. Furthermore, and subsequent to being issued a certificate of registration, virtual 
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currency exchanges are required to register with the Anti-Money Laundering Council 
Secretariat.
247
 
 
Virtual currency exchanges are further required to put in place adequate risk management and 
security control mechanisms to address, manage and mitigate technology risks associated with 
virtual currencies.
248
 
 
In addition, virtual currency exchanges providing wallet services for holding, storing and 
transferring virtual currencies are required to establish effective cyber security programs 
consisting of storage and transactional security requirements to ensure the integrity and 
security of virtual currency wallets and transactions.
249
 
 
(b) United States of America  
 
 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen), a bureau of the United States 
Department of Treasury, issued the FinCen 2013 Guidance
250
 on 18 March 2013, which 
serves as an interpretive guidance to clarify the applicability of the regulations implementing 
the Bank Secrecy Act (the BSA) to persons creating, obtaining, distributing, exchanging, 
accepting or transmitting virtual currencies.
251
 
 
 The FinCen’s Regulations define a ‘money transmitter’ as a person that provides money 
transmission services or any person that engages in the transfer of funds; and a ‘money 
service business’ as the acceptance of currency, funds or other value that substitutes currency 
to another location or person by any means.
252
 
 
 The FinCen’s 2013 Guidance indicates that a user obtaining virtual currency to purchase 
goods and services is not considered as a money transmitter;
253
 however the case is or may be 
different for administrators and exchangers.  
 
                                                 
247
 Sub-section 4512N.3 of the Philippines Guidelines. 
248
 Sub-section 4512N.6 of the Philippines Guidelines. 
249
 Sub-section 4512N.6 of the Philippines Guidelines. 
250
 The FinCEN 2013 Guidance is entitled ‘Application of FinCen’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging 
or using virtual currencies’ FIN-2013-G001 (hereinafter referred to as ‘FinCen’s 2013 Guidance’). 
251
 FinCen’s 2013 Guidance 1. 
252
 FinCen’s Regulations section  1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) referred to in FinCen’s 2013 Guidance 3. 
253
 FinCen’s 2013 Guidance 2. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 88 
 An exchanger is defined as a person engaged as a business in exchange of virtual currencies 
for real currencies, funds or other virtual currencies; and an administrator as a person engaged 
as a business in issuing (putting into circulation) a virtual currency and who has the authority 
to redeem such virtual currency.
254
 
 
 An administrator or exchanger that accepts and transmits; or buys or sells a convertible virtual 
currency, is a money transmitter under FinCen’s Regulations. The FinCen’s 2013 Guidance 
indicates that the definition of ‘money transmitter’ does not differentiate between real 
currency and convertible virtual currencies; and any person accepting or transmitting anything 
to value that substitutes currency is considered a money transmitter.
255
 
 
(c) Australia 
 
 On 03 April 2018, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
commenced regulation of digital currency exchanges under the anti-money laundering and 
counter terrorism financing (AML/CTF) laws by amending the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (the Act).
256
 
 
 The Act requires any person providing registrable digital currency exchange services, such as 
any service that involves the exchange of any fiat currency, whether Australian dollars or not 
to cryptocurrency and vice versa, and which must be conducted in eh course of the carrying 
on digital currency exchange business, to register with AUSTRAC.
257
 
 
 Once registered, digital currency exchanges are subject to AML/CFT compliance and 
reporting obligations; to collect and store information on customers’ identities; have a system 
to monitor suspicious activity, report any suspicious transactions; and establish an AML/CFT 
compliance program.
258
 
 
 The Act further introduces a policy principles period, which commenced on 03 April 2018 
and expired on 02 October 2018. During that period digital currency exchanges were not 
                                                 
254
 FinCen’s 2013 Guidance 2. 
255
 FinCen’s 2013 Guidance 3. 
256
 Whittaker S, Ng S and Lee H ‘New AML/CFT Regulations for cryptocurrency exchanges’ 23 April 2018 1 available 
at www.pwc.com.au (accessed 18 November 2018) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Whittaker et al (23 April 2018)’). 
257
 Whittaker et al (23 April 2018) 1. 
258
 Whittaker et al (23 April 2018) 1. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 89 
subject to enforcement action as long as they took reasonable steps to implement compliance 
obligation. 
 
 They were, however, required to establish an AML/CFT compliance program and implement 
necessary procedures to support AML/CFT compliance; and now that the period has expired, 
all digital currency exchanges must be registered and must be AML/CFT compliant.
259
 
 
(d) Japan 
 
 Japan introduced its first regulation of virtual currency exchange service providers (VCESP) 
by amending its Payment System Act. 
 
 The Payment System Act amendment creates a new category referred to as the VCESP, which 
was added to three (3) existing categories, namely the issuer of payment securities; fund 
transfer service provider; and the clearing institution for interbank fund transfer.
260
  
 
 The Payment System Act defines a VCESP as the performance of any of the following acts in 
the course of trade:
261
 
 
(i)  the purchase and sale of virtual currencies or an exchange with other virtual currencies;  
(ii) the intermediation, brokerage or agency of the acts is in (i); and  
(iii) the management of users’ money or virtual currency in connection with the acts in (i) and (ii). 
 
 Registration is required in order to provide a virtual currency exchange service. In order to 
ensure user protection, other provisions concerning the segregation of virtual currencies/cash 
belong to the service and the users, information management, explanations to prevent users 
from mistaking virtual currencies as legal tenders, information regarding fees and an external 
audit by a certified public accountant or an audit corporation on the status of segregated 
management.
262
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 Regulators will supervise annual reports and reports on the amount of virtual currencies and 
cash management by VCESPs, as well as conduct on-site inspections, in terms of the Payment 
System Act.
263
 
 
The new section 63-10 of the Payment System Act states that VCESP must provide 
explanations to customers to prevent them from misidentifying virtual currencies as Japanese 
or foreign currencies; and to provide information on fees, other terms and conditions of 
contracts pertaining to virtual currency exchange service, and other measures necessary of the 
protection of users.
264
 
 
 In the case of customer disputes, the amendment to the Payment System Act requires the 
VCESP to seek a resolution through the so-called financial alternative dispute resolution.
265
  
 
 The amended Payment Service Act requires that users’ funds and virtual currencies are 
managed separately from the VCESP’s own cash or virtual currencies.266 
 
 The amendment to the Payment System Act also amended the Act on Prevention of Transfer 
of Criminal Proceedings dealing with money laundering, extending the provisions of the Act 
on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceedings to VCESP. This means that VCESP is 
subject to the provisions of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceedings.
267
  
 
4.2.3 Self-regulation: South Korea  
 
 On 30 January 2018, the South Korean Government issued an administrative decision aimed 
at digital currency exchanges.
268
 This administrative decision prohibits anonymous trading, 
and trading by foreigners and minors through digital currency exchanges.
269
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 Under these regulations, digital currency exchanges are required to share users’ transactions 
data with banks. South Korea users are required to use bank accounts in their legal name that 
matches the name on the digital currency accounts.
270
 
 
 On 17 April 2018, representatives
271
 of fourteen (14) Korean digital currency exchanges 
released self-regulatory, but non-legal binding guidelines for digital currency exchanges in 
South Korea.
272
 The self-regulation guidelines involve an inspection of all member 
cryptocurrency exchanges and require the satisfaction of the following five conditions:
273
 
 
(a) managing of clients’ digital coins and their own separately; 
(b) coping with abnormal transactions quickly; 
(c) floating new digital currency with enhanced protection systems; 
(d) holding a minimum equity of KRWs billion (USD 1,8 million); and 
(e) publishing regular audit and finance reports. 
 
 Save for the regulations prohibiting anonymous trading and requiring users to use identifiable 
names when trading, cryptocurrency-based exchanges within South Korea are self-regulated. 
It is trite to point out that self-regulation does not place an obligation on the self-regulated 
industry to for instance, report suspicious activities to any regulator or law enforcement 
agency. Self-regulation rules and regulation are not binding and remains voluntary. 
 
4.2.4 Introduction of new regulations: Abu Dhabi and the New York State Department of 
Financial Services’ (NYSDFS) Regulations 
 
 The Abu Dhabi and NYSDFS Regulations are new enactments, which are specifically 
designed to regulate cryptocurrency-based exchanges and cryptocurrency wallet provision as 
is set out below. 
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(a) Abu Dhabi 
 
 On 25 June 2018, the Abu Dhabi Global Markets introduced Guidance Regulations of 
Cryptocurrency Asset Activities (the ADGM Guidance) under section 15(1) of the Financial 
Services and Markets Regulations.  
 
The ADGM Guidance applies to any person carrying on regulated activity of operating a 
crypto asset business; and any authorised person in respect of its carrying on the regulated 
activity of crypto asset business.
274
  
 
Paragraph 9 of the ADGM Guidance refers to cryptocurrency as ‘crypto asset’, which is a 
digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as a medium of 
exchange; and/or a unit of account; and/or a store of value, but is not legal tender or 
government issued. 
 
In terms of Paragraph 10, crypto assets are treated as commodities, and crypto asset 
exchanges dealing or managing crypto assets are required to obtain a licence or approval 
before operating as such. In addition, all authorised crypto asset businesses must comply with 
the Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Rules; and Rules of Market Conduct.
275
 
 
Paragraph 15 of the ADGM Guidance provides the following definitions: 
 
(i) ‘crypto asset activity’ include the buying, selling or exercising any right in accepted crypto 
assets; managing accepted crypto assets belonging to another person; and operating a crypto 
asset exchange or as a crypto asset custodian; 
 
(ii) a ‘crypto asset exchange’ means the trading, exchange or conversion of a crypto asset for fiat 
currency or vice versa; or one accepted crypto asset into another accepted crypto asset; and 
 
(iii) a ‘crypto asset custodian’ means the safeguarding, holding, storing or maintaining custody of 
accepted crypto asset belonging to another person; or controlling or maintain accepted crypto 
asset for the aforementioned purpose. 
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 Paragraph 19 identifies the risk areas and mitigation thereof as pointed out below: 
 
(iv) money laundering risk, which should be mitigated by reporting;  
 
(v) consumer risk, which should be mitigated by provision of all risks associated with crypto 
assets to the customer and disclosure of all services and products to the customer; and  
 
(vi) technology governance risk, which must be mitigated by putting in place systems and controls 
in relation to crypto asset wallets, private keys, origin and destination of crypto asset fund, 
security, risk management and systems recovery. 
 
 Furthermore, and in terms of Paragraph 19.4, crypto asset exchanges are required to put in 
place market surveillance, settlement processes, transaction recording, transparency and 
public disclosure, and exchange-like operational systems and controls.  
 
 Insofar as it relates to crypto asset wallet custodial services and in terms of Paragraph 19.5, 
the service provider will be required to conduct frequent reconciliations and reporting of 
crypto assets.                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
(b) New York State Department of Financial Services’ (NYSDFS) Regulations 
 
 The NYSDFS introduced the BitLicence in June 2015 contained under the New York Codes, 
Rules and Regulations, Title 23 Department of Financial Services, Chapter 1 Regulations of  
the Superintendent of Financial Services, Part 200 Virtual Currencies; and aimed at regulating 
the virtual currency sector (NYSDFS Regulations). 
 
 The NYSDFS Regulations exempts merchants or consumers that use virtual currency solely 
for the purchase or sale of goods or services from the application of the NYSDFS 
Regulations.
276
 
 
 Section 200.2 of the NYSDFS Regulations define, amongst other terms, the following 
relevant terms: 
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(i) a ‘cyber security event’ entails “an act or an attempt, successful or unsuccessful, to gain 
unauthorised access to, or disrupt or misuse of a Licensee’s electronic system or information 
stored on such a system”;277 
 
(ii) an ‘exchange service’ as “the conversion of fiat currency into virtual currency or vice versa; 
or the exchange of one form of virtual currency into another form of virtual currency”;278 
 
(iii) a ‘transmission’ as “the transfer, by or through a third party, of virtual currency from a person 
to a person, including the transfer form an account or storage repository of a person to an 
account or storage repository of another person”;279 
 
(iv) a ‘virtual currency’ as “any type of digital unit that is used as a medium of exchange or a form 
of digitally stored of value”;280 
(v) a ‘virtual currency business activity’ includes the following:281 
 
(aa) receiving virtual currency for transmission or transmitting virtual currency; 
(bb) storing, holding or maintaining custody or control of virtual currency on behalf of others; 
(cc)  buying and selling virtual currency as a customer business; 
(dd) performing exchange services as a customer business; or 
(ee) controlling, administering or issuing of virtual currency. 
 
 Section 200.9(a) requires all Licensees to maintain a surety bond of trust account for the 
benefit of its customers’ in the form and amount as is acceptable with the superintendent for 
the protection of Licensee’s customers.  
 
 In addition, where the Licensee stores, holds, or maintains custody or control of virtual 
currency on behalf of another person, the Licensee is required to hold virtual currency of the 
same type and amount as that which is owed or obligated to another person.
282
 
  
 Section 200.15 deals with the anti-money laundering requirements that a Licensee must 
comply with, which requires a Licensee to conduct an initial risk assessment that will 
                                                 
277
 Section 200.2(b) of the NYSDFS Regulations. 
278
 Section 200.2(d) of NYSDFS Regulations. 
279
 Section 200.2(o) of NYSDFS Regulations. 
280
 Section 200.2(p) of NYSDFS Regulations. 
281 Section 200.2(q) of NYSDFS Regulations. 
282
 See section 200.9(b) of the NYSDFS Regulations. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 95 
consider legal, compliance, financial and reputational risk associated with the activities 
conducted by the Licensee; and shall establish, maintain and enforce an anti-money 
laundering program based thereon.
283
  
 
 The licensee is thereafter required to conduct an annual assessment or more frequently as the 
risks change, and to modify its anti-money laundering program accordingly.
284
 The anti-
money laundering program must further contain a written anti-money laundering policy.
285
 
 
 In terms of section 200.15(c)(1), the anti-money laundering program must, at the minim, 
amongst other things, provide for a system of internal controls, policies and procedures 
designed to ensure ongoing compliance.  
 
 The Licensee must, as part of the anti-money laundering program, maintain information of all 
virtual currency transactions involving payment, receipt, exchange, conversion, purchase, 
sale, transfer or transmission of virtual currency;
286
 and monitor virtual currency transactions 
that may signify money laundering, tax evasion to other illegal or criminal activity.
287
 
 
 In terms of section 200.15(h), a Licensee must further, as part of the anti-money laundering 
program, maintain a customer verification program aim at identifying and verifying account 
holders. 
  
 Section 200.16 requires a Licensee to establish and maintain a cyber security program to 
ensure the availability and functionality of the Licensee’ electronic systems; and to protect 
those systems and any sensitive data from unauthorised access, use or tampering. 
 
 The Licensee must further implement a cyber security policy stipulating the Licensee’s 
policies and procedures for the protection of its electronic system; and customer and counter-
party data stored on those systems.
288
 
 
 Section 200.19 deals with consumer protection and requires a Licensee, as part of establishing 
a relationship with its customer, to disclose all material risks associated with the use of its 
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products, services and activities; and virtual currency generally, before entering into an initial 
transaction with a customer.
289
 
 
 Such information must, at the minimum, include that virtual currency is not legal tender; that 
legislative and regulatory changes may adversely affect the use, transfer, exchange or value of 
virtual currency; that transactions in virtual currency are irreversible and losses due to 
fraudulent and accidental transactions may be irrecoverable; that the volatility and the 
unpredictability of virtual currency relative to fiat currency may result in significant losses 
over a short period of time; and the nature of virtual currency may resulting in increased risk 
of fraud and losses.
290
 
 
 Section 200.19(g) requires the Licensee not to engage in fraudulent activity and to take 
reasonable steps to detect and prevent fraud, including the establishment and implementation 
of an anti-fraud policy.  
 
 The anti-fraud policy must, at the minimum include, the identification and assessment of 
fraud-related risk areas; procedures and controls to protect against identified risks; allocation 
of responsibility for monitoring risks; and procedures for the periodic evaluation and revision 
of anti-fraud procedures, controls and monitoring mechanisms.
291
 
 
Therefore, globally, cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation can take various forms, 
namely a complete prohibition or frustration of conduct of cryptocurrency-related services; 
regulation under existing legislation with the necessary amendments; self-regulation; and enactment 
of legislation aimed specifically at cryptocurrency-based intermediation and service provision. 
 
Furthermore, where authorities choose to regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries such 
regulation may encompass acquisition of a licence or require registration or authorisation; 
compliance with anti-money laundering and user protection requirements; and the establishment 
and implementation of cyber security and anti-fraud policies. 
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However, the aforementioned regulatory responses are first, mostly rules-based requiring 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries to comply with technical requirements, save for the ADGM 
Guideline and NYSDFS Regulations, which incorporate risk-based requirements.
292
  
 
Secondly, the aforementioned regulatory responses are aimed at enhancing public law purposes 
with an indirect private law purpose, in other words, achievement of user protection through 
addressing public law issues such as anti-money laundering, cyber security, user protection and 
anti-fraud. 
 
The aforementioned regulatory approaches therefore fail to define the scope of the relationship 
between the users and cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; dispute resolution in the event a dispute 
arises between the user and cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; or recovery and reimbursement of 
losses a user may suffer in the event that a cryptocurrency-based intermediary becomes insolvent or 
absconds with the users’ cryptocurrency. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter identified the rationale for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation and 
explored the various global regulatory responses to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries.  
 
This chapter further discovered that cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation may take 
various forms with varying impact on the risks identified in chapter two, namely: 
 
(a)  the prohibition, which does not detect, address and mitigate any of the risks identified in 
chapter two;  
 
(b) the application of existing legislation, which is aimed at governing cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries as if they are providing similar services as those entities and services regulated 
by the existing legislation without proper regard to the risks identified in chapter two, 
therefore this does not effectively detect, address and mitigate all the risks identified in 
chapter two;  
 
                                                 
292
 See the discussion on rules-based and risk-based approach to regulation in Paragraph 3.6 of chapter 3. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 98 
(c) self-regulation, which is voluntary and lacks accountability on the part of the self-regulated 
industry, and, which does not effectively detect, address and mitigate all the risks identified in 
chapter two; and 
 
(d) the enactment of legislation specifically designed to regulate cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and the services they provide, which has the potential of effectively detecting, 
addressing and mitigating the risks identified in chapter two with necessary addition of certain 
rules and requirements. 
 
 The rules and requirements referred to in Paragraph (d) above should include: 
 
(i) identifying and governing the relationship between a user and the cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries;  
(ii) dispute resolution mechanisms; 
(iii)  clearly stipulated punitive measure for non-complying cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; 
and  
(iv) reimbursement or refund of users’ funds in the event of insolvency of cryptocurrency-based 
intermediary or loss of users’ cryptocurrency suffered due to failure to maintain adequate 
internal controls and security systems and criminal consequences upon abscondment of 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary administrators or employees. 
 
The aforementioned, and more particularly Paragraph (d) above with the suggested modifications, 
will form the basis of recommendations aimed at designing a legal framework that should govern 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries in Africa, which is discussed in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As previously suggested in chapter one, cryptocurrency-based intermediation has found its way into 
Africa as exemplified by referenced examples of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, such as 
Luno, Belfrics and BitPesa indicated in chapter two. 
 
These cryptocurrency-based intermediaries conduct their services outside the scope of regulatory 
legislation applicable in countries such as South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria, some of which operate, 
in addition to their operation within the aforementioned countries, in other African countries.  
 
In order to test whether existing legislation regulating conventional financial intermediaries 
providing comparable or similar services as cryptocurrency-based intermediaries may apply to 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, an examination was conducted in chapter three of this 
research. This concluded that such legislation was not applicable and unsuitable to regulate 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
Furthermore, this research considered global regulatory responses to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries in order to ascertain the most suitable regulatory approach to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries in Africa. 
 
The aforementioned were dispensed of the sub-objectives identified in chapter one in order to 
determine the most suitable design for cryptocurrency-based intermediation in Africa, which was 
the main objective of this research. 
 
To that end, this chapter is aimed at providing a summary of discussions, examinations and 
explorations undertaken in chapters one to four of this research and to recommend the most suitable 
approach to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation in Africa. 
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5.1 Conclusion 
 
 The main objective of this research was to design a cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ 
regulatory legal framework for Africa aimed at user protection and regulating the conduct of 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries in Africa. To this end, additional sub-objectives were 
designed to achieve the main objective. 
 
 These sub-objectives included the following: 
 
(a) providing an understanding of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and identifying potential 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ risks and users’ risks;  
 
(b) conducting an analysis into whether existing legislation applying to conventional financial 
intermediaries could be applied to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries;  
 
(c) if not, whether such legislation would be suitable to regulate cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries; and  
 
(d) if so, which regulatory approaches were most suitable to design such cryptocurrency-based 
intermediary regulatory framework. 
 
 To achieve and dispense of the aforementioned objectives, chapters one to four provided the 
following: 
 
5.1.1 Chapter One 
 
 Chapter one introduced the research into cryptocurrency intermediation in Africa; identified 
and specified the research objectives and questions relevant to this research; the significance 
of this research; the chapter outline; the methodology undertaken and provided the relevant 
definitions. 
 
 Chapter one further provided a basic overview of cryptocurrency by setting out the history 
and salient features of cryptocurrency; the manner in which cryptocurrency is acquired and 
referred to some examples of cryptocurrency, the purpose of which was to clarify the role of 
cryptocurrency in the cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ service provision. 
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5.1.2 Chapter Two 
 
 Chapter two dispensed of the first sub-objective by providing an overview of cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries; the type of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; the activities and/or 
services conducted by such intermediaries; and the potential risks they pose to the users 
through their conduct.  
 
 This chapter provided an overview on the following pertinent issues: 
 
(a) cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, by using cryptocurrency as a medium of exchange or 
method of payment, links buyers and sellers of cryptocurrency; 
 
(b) cryptocurrency-based intermediaries exchange cryptocurrency for other cryptocurrency, and 
if they are centralised, records such exchanges on their own systems, however if they are 
decentralised, the transaction is recorded on the ledger of the relevant cryptocurrency 
network; 
 
(c) cryptocurrency-based intermediaries exchange cryptocurrency for fiat currency much like the 
exchange or currency conversion that occurs when exchanging for instance a US dollar for 
South African Rand; 
 
(d)  cryptocurrency-based intermediaries remit cryptocurrency from a sender to a recipient in the 
same country or in another country, and convert or exchange such cryptocurrency for fiat 
currency or cryptocurrency;  
 
(e) cryptocurrency-based intermediaries provide cryptocurrency wallet storage services, online 
and/or offline, to users; and  
(f) that the use of cryptocurrency-based intermediary services may pose some risks to users; 
and/or result in some potential risks for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries providing the 
aforementioned services. The potential risks identified in chapter two are as follows: 
 
(i) Cryptocurrency-based intermediaries related risks, namely the risk of exchange breach, which 
included security breach, data loss, insider scam, data loss, legal action; and additionally, the 
risk of money laundering (cryptocurrency-based intermediaries related risks); 
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(ii) Users’ risks, namely, the risk of loss of cryptocurrency on account of cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries’ related risks.  
 
In addition, the risk of unauthorised use of cryptocurrency private key where user entrusts and 
cedes control and access to the cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; the risk of closure of 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary and shut down of website; risk of inability to access and 
loss of cryptocurrency held with cryptocurrency-based intermediaries as a result of such 
closure and shut down; risk of insolvency cryptocurrency-based intermediary and the 
application of existing insolvency legislation that may not reimburse user in cryptocurrency; 
and the risk of and administrator of cryptocurrency-based intermediary absconding with user 
cryptocurrency. 
 
5.1.3 Chapter Three 
 
Chapter three dispensed of the second and the third sub-objectives by undertaking the 
following:  
 
(a) Chapter three first identified and examined legislation within South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya 
regulating conventional financial intermediaries with the aim of determining the applicability 
and suitability of such legislation to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
This chapter concluded that such legislation, save for those that apply to consumer protection 
and due to the determination made by the Kenyan Court in the BitPesa case, the Kenyan 
legislation applicable to money remittance service providers, did not apply to cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries. 
 
(b) Secondly, this chapter concluded that such legislation was not suitable to regulate 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries insofar as it related to addressing the potential risks 
identified in chapter two. 
 
5.1.4 Chapter Four 
 
 This chapter addressed the fourth sub-objective, which was aimed at identifying the possible 
regulatory approaches to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation. Chapter four 
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identified the rationale for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation; and explored 
various global regulatory responses to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries.  
 
To this end, this chapter identified and examined a complete prohibition to conduct 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ services (China) and frustrating the conduct of such 
services (India); application of existing legislation to regulate cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries (Philippines, FinCen, Australia and Japan); self-regulation (South Korea); and 
enactment of new regulation to regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries (Abu Dhabi 
Global Markets Guidance and New York State Regulations). 
 
 This chapter concluded that the Abu Dhabi Global Markets Guidance and New York State 
Regulations provide the most suitable regulatory approach, in form and substance, to address 
the risks posed to users and to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, and form the basis of 
regulating cryptocurrency-based intermediaries in Africa. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
 
 The recommended regulatory legal framework for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries (the 
recommended regulatory legal framework) should be based on and be informed by the issues 
canvassed in chapters one to four, more particularly the potential risks identified, the 
regulatory approaches recommended and the rationale for regulation clearly postulated in 
those chapters. 
 
 This research proposes the following regulatory approach to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries’ regulation and regulatory legal framework for cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries in Africa: 
 
5.2.1 The recommended regulatory approach to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries: rules-
based and/or risk-based approach 
 
 This research proposes an integrated approach to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ 
regulation, namely regulation aimed at the identification, monitoring and mitigation of risks; 
and regulation consisting of a system of rules through which the regulator should ensure 
technical compliance by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
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 As previously postulated in chapter three a rules-based regulatory approach is essentially 
aimed at setting laws, rules and requirements for technical compliance such as licensing and 
penalties for non-compliance, which, on its own, will not be suitable for cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries’ regulation 293  due to failure of such a regulatory approach to address the 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ related risks and users risks. 
 
 Therefore, in addition, to prescribing rules and requirements for technical compliance, the 
recommended framework for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries must also impose an 
obligation on cryptocurrency-based intermediaries to establish, and continuous develop risk 
identification and assessment tools and mitigate such risks. In addition, the failure to establish 
and implement such tools must be subject to some consequence. 
 
 The aforementioned approach is recommended to enable regulators to exercise some control 
over cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and the conduct of their activities whilst imposing 
an obligation on cryptocurrency-based intermediaries to identify, continuously assess, 
monitor and mitigate cryptocurrency-based related and users’ risks. 
 
5.2.2 The rationale for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation: public law and 
private law purpose 
 
 This research proposes cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulatory legal framework that 
is based on a two-fold rationale as postulated in chapter four,
294
 which is aimed at achieving a 
public law purpose and a private law purpose. 
 
 In addition, the public law purpose should be achieved through the enactment of a regulatory 
legal framework that follows both a risk-based and rules-based approach. Insofar as it pertains 
to achieve the private law purpose, it recommended that mandatory contractual terms be 
incorporated into the contractual arrangements entered into between the users and 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries.
295
 
  
                                                 
293
 See Paragraph 3.6 of chapter three for a discussion on the suitability of rules-based regulation to cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries. 
294
 See Paragraph 4.1 of chapter 4 insofar as it relates to a discussion pertaining to the rationale for cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries’ regulation. 
295
 Paragraph 2.2 of chapter two indicates that, before using the services of Luno. Belfric and BitPesa, the user is 
required to accept agree to standardised Terms and Conditions of the respective cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
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 Furthermore, this research proposes the enactment of a new regulatory legal framework 
similar to the Abu Dhabi Global Markets Guidance Regulations of Cryptocurrency Asset 
Activities (ADGM Guidance) and the New York State Department of Financial Services’ 
(NYSDFS) Regulations
296
 insofar as it relates to public law aspects.  
 
5.2.3 Salient provisions of the recommended regulatory legal framework for cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries 
 
 This sub-paragraph postulates the salient provisions of the recommended regulatory legal 
framework for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries in two ways, namely by first defining the 
scope of application of the recommended regulatory legal framework to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries; and secondly, by specifying public law aspects and the private law aspects. 
 
(a) Scope of application of the recommended regulatory legal framework 
 
 As cryptocurrency-based intermediaries take various forms
297
 therefore, the recommended 
regulatory legal framework must define the scope of application to cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries, that is, whether the recommended regulatory legal framework will apply to or 
regulate, generally, all types of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries
298
 and their sub-
categories, if any, or be specifically aimed at types of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries or 
simply the activities conducted by such cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
 For instance, the ADGM Guidance regulates any person conducting the regulated activity of 
operating a cryptocurrency asset business, which means that the ADGM Guidance regulation 
is two-fold, namely it regulates the cryptocurrency-based intermediary and the activity 
conducted by such cryptocurrency-based intermediary.
 299
 
 
In the instance of ADGM Guidance, the activity of carrying on cryptocurrency asset activity 
includes the buying, selling or exercising any right in accepted crypto assets; managing 
accepted crypto assets belonging to another person; and operating a crypto asset exchange or 
as a crypto asset custodian.
300
  
                                                 
296
 See Paragraph 4.2.4 of chapter 4. 
297
 See Paragraph 2.1 of chapter two on the discussion of types of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
298
 See Paragraph 2.1.1 of chapter two discussing the types of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
299
 See Paragraph 4.2.4(a) of chapter four in this regard. 
300
 See Paragraph 4.2.4(a) of chapter four in this regard. 
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 Another example is the NYSDFS Regulations
301
 regulating virtual currency business activity, 
which includes receiving virtual currency for transmission or transmitting virtual currency; 
storing, holding or maintaining custody or control of virtual currency on behalf of others; 
buying and selling virtual currency as a customer business; performing exchange services as a 
customer business; or controlling, administering or issuing of virtual currency.
302
 
 
 Therefore, and insofar as it relates to the application of public law aspects, it is proposed that 
the recommended regulatory legal framework applies to both the cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries and the activities they conduct, which includes all activities listed or specified 
in the ADGN Guidance and the NYSDFS Regulations.  
 
 However, a distinction should be drawn between the categories of cryptocurrency-based 
exchanges, namely centralised and decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchanges;
303
 and 
custodial and non-custodial wallet storage,
304
 as is set out below. 
 
(i)  Scope of application to centralised and decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchanges 
 
 As postulated in chapter two, cryptocurrency-based exchanges are categorised either as 
centralised or decentralised.
305
 These two types of cryptocurrency-based exchanges provide 
intermediation to users either simply linking purchasers and sellers of cryptocurrency;
306
 or 
acting as a merchant selling cryptocurrency to its users;
307
 or providing a platform through 
which purchasers and seller buy and sell cryptocurrency
308
. 
 
                                                 
301
 This does not mean that other global regulatory legal frameworks governing cryptocurrency-based intermediaries do 
not sufficiently defined the scope of application of such legal frameworks to cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, but 
that the scope of application of the NYSDFS Relations and the ADGM Guidelines provide more clarity in that regard. 
302
 See Paragraph 4.2.4(b) of chapter four in this regard. 
303
 See Paragraph 2.1.1(c) of chapter two regarding the discussion of the categories of cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
304
 See Paragraph 2.1.2(a) of chapter two regarding the discussion of custodial and non-custodial wallets. 
305
 See Paragraph 2.1.2(c) of chapter two regarding the discussion on the categories of cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
306
 Luno is an example of a cryptocurrency-based intermediary providing these services. See Paragraph 2.2.1 of chapter 
two in this regard. 
307
 BitPesa is an example of a cryptocurrency-based intermediary providing these services. See Paragraph 2.2.3 of 
chapter two in this regard. 
308
 Belfrics is an example of a cryptocurrency-based intermediary providing these services. See Paragraph 2.2.2 of 
chapter two in this regard. 
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 There are inherent differences between the aforementioned types of cryptocurrency-based 
exchanges relating to control of funds; anonymity and authentication of transactions 
conducted on the cryptocurrency-based exchanges.
309
 
 
 The transactions on a decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchange is conducted 
anonymously, and verified and authenticated on the relevant cryptocurrency network. In 
contrast, on a centralised cryptocurrency-based exchange, transactions may or can be 
conducted anonymously.
310
 The risk of money laundering is intensified where 
cryptocurrency-related transactions are conducted anonymously.
311
  
  
 Therefore, the following is proposed insofar as it relates to the application of the 
recommended regulatory legal framework to centralised and decentralised cryptocurrency-
based exchanges: 
 
(aa) the recommended regulatory legal framework should apply to all types of cryptocurrency-
based exchanges; and  
(bb) anonymous trading should be prohibited; and 
(cc) the recommended regulated legal framework requires record-keeping and reporting of all 
transactions conducted on a cryptocurrency-based exchange, however such requirement 
should not be imposed on a decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchange because 
transactions are recorded on the blockchain (recorded on the decentralised network of the 
cryptocurrency traded). 
 
 (ii) Scope of application to cryptocurrency wallet service providers 
 
 As postulated in chapter two, a cryptocurrency wallet service provider does not provide non-
custodial storage services. This type of wallet storage does not require the services of a wallet 
service provider. In this instance a cryptocurrency owner provides his/her/its own storage.
312
 
 
                                                 
309
 See Paragraph 2.1.1(c) of chapter two regarding the discussion of the differences between centralised and 
decentralised cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
310
 See paragraph 2.1.1(c) of chapter two regarding the distinction on the categories of cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
311
 See Paragraph 2.3.1(b) of chapter two on the discussion of money laundering risk. 
312
 See Paragraph 2.1.2(b) of chapter two discussion non-custodial storage of cryptocurrency. 
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 A cryptocurrency service provider provide custodial wallet storage services, which can be 
storage services either online (hot) or offline (cold). The risk of exchange breach in the form 
of a security breach is higher in online storage.
313
 
 
 The risk of exchange breach in the form of a security breach is less likely with cold storage, 
which is offline, providing storage facilities on a physical site, theft of cryptocurrency can 
only be achieved by physically stealing cryptocurrency private keys held in a cold storage. 
 
 In both instances of storage, the cryptocurrency wallet provider is entrusted with 
cryptocurrency (private keys) belonging to users, and should be required to ensure safe 
keeping of such cryptocurrency and secure internal systems. The recommended cyber security 
requirements are discussed elsewhere in this chapter.  
 
 In light of the aforementioned reasons, the recommended regulatory legal framework should 
thus apply only to custodial storage provision by cryptocurrency wallet providers. 
 
(iii) Scope of application to cryptocurrency-based remittance service providers 
  
 Cryptocurrency-based remittance service providers use blockchain technology to remit 
cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency-based remittance service providers further accept 
cryptocurrency from a sender and, transmit such cryptocurrency to a recipient and/or convert 
such cryptocurrency transmitted by a sender into fiat currency for the recipient.  
 
 It is recommended that the scope of application of the recommended regulatory legal 
framework should include cryptocurrency-based remittance service providers. 
 
(b) Public law aspects  
 
 The public law provisions should address market conduct, which should include licensing 
requirements; impose obligation to establish and implement anti-money laundering programs, 
user protection programs, cyber security programs and anti-theft programs; continuous risk 
assessment; and address miscellaneous issues.  
 
                                                 
313
 See Paragraph 2.1.2(a) of chapter two discussion custodial storage of cryptocurrency. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 109 
This sub-paragraph sets out and provides a clarification of the public law aspects specified in 
Paragraph 5.2(a) above that should be contained in the recommended regulatory legal 
framework.  
 
 (i) Market conduct 
 
 It is proposed that the recommended regulatory legal framework introduces a licensing or 
registration regime to allow a relevant authority to have the power to have control over 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries and the services they provide. 
 
Therefore, the conducting of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ activities must be subject 
to a licence, meaning that any person conducting such activities must obtain a licence from a 
relevant authority (licensing authority). 
 
The licensing authority must not impose strict requirements to obtain such a licence or require 
the payment of exhorbitant fees. The licensing authority must be empowered to either grant, 
with or without conditions, or refuse to grant a licence; and revoke or withdraw such a 
licence; or modify the conditions of such licence. 
 
(ii) Addressing the cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ related risks 
 
 Chapter two identifies two types of risks to which cryptocurrency-based intermediaries are 
susceptible, namely exchange breach risk consisting of security breach, data loss, insider 
scam, and legal action; and money laundering risk.
314
  
 
It is recommended that, in order to detect, monitor and mitigate this risk, cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries must be required to undertake the following actions:
315
 
 
(aa) conduct an initial risk assessment that will consider legal, compliance, financial and 
reputational risk associated with the activities conducted by the cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries; 
(bb) establish, maintain and enforce programs based on the aforementioned risk assessment; 
                                                 
314
 See Paragraph 2.3 of chapter two on the identified cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ related risk. 
315
 The recommendation made to address cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ related risk is based on the NYSDFS 
Regulations and the ADGM Guidance discussed under Paragraph 4.2.4 of chapter four. 
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(cc) conduct an annual assessment of the aforementioned risks or more frequently as the risks 
changes, and modify its risk programs; and 
(dd) designate a department or individual responsible for compliance, coordination and monitoring 
of the day-to-day compliance with the various risk programs. 
 
 In addition, and insofar as it relates specifically to money laundering risk, maintain 
information of all cryptocurrency transactions involving payment, receipt, exchange, 
conversion, purchase, sale, transfer or transmission of cryptocurrency;
316
 a user verification 
program aimed at verifying and identifying account holders;
317
 and the detection and 
reporting of suspicious transactions. 
 
 In relation to keeping record of transactions, care should be taken regarding the fact that 
decentralised cryptocurrency-based intermediaries might not be able to comply with the 
requirement due to the decentralised nature of authentication and verification of transactions 
conducted on such cryptocurrency-based exchanges. 
 
 (iii) In order to address users’ risk  
 
 In both the ADGM Guidance and NYSDFS Regulations, licensed cryptocurrency-based 
businesses are required to warn users against material risks attributable to the use of 
cryptocurrency and the use of such services.
318
 
 
 The NYSDFS Regulations indicate that such information may include:
319
 
 
(aa) that cryptocurrency is not legal tender;  
(bb) that legislative and regulatory changes may adversely affect the use, transfer, exchange or 
value of cryptocurrency;  
(cc) that transactions in virtual currency are irreversible and losses due to fraudulent and 
accidental transactions may be irrecoverable;  
                                                 
316
 Similar to that which is required under section 200.15(a) of the NYSDFS Regulations discussed in Paragraph 
4.2.4(b) of chapter four. 
317
 Similar to that which is required under section 200.15(h) of the NYSDFS Regulations discussed in Paragraph 
4.2.4(b) of chapter four. 
318
 See Paragraph 4.2.4 (a) and (b) of chapter four in this regard. 
319
 See Paragraph 4.2.4(b) of chapter four in that regard, and in addition, section 200.19(a) of the NYSDFS Regulations. 
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(dd) that the volatility and the unpredictability of cryptocurrency relative to fiat currency may 
result in significant losses over a short period of time; and  
(ee) that the nature of cryptocurrency may resulting in increased risk of fraud and losses. 
  
 It is suggested that the recommended regulatory legal framework requires the disclosure of 
similar (in scope and form) information to the user at the time the user initiates the use of the 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary’s business.320 
 
 In addition, the recommended regulatory legal framework should impose a duty upon the 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries to keep and provide records of cryptocurrency 
transferred and received into the users account;
321
 or provide access to a user to be able to 
check the amount of cryptocurrency standing to the credit of the user at intervals prescribed or 
at any time a user wishes to ascertain such information.
322
 
 
 Furthermore, where the cryptocurrency-based intermediary provides custodial wallet storage 
services to users and, thus store and hold cryptocurrency on behalf of users, such a 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary should hold cryptocurrency of the same type and amount 
as that which is held on behalf of users.
323
  
 
This requirement is aimed at curbing the risk that users may not be reimbursed in the event of 
insolvency of the cryptocurrency based intermediary; and/or when an administrator of the 
cryptocurrency-based intermediary absconds with users’ cryptocurrency.324  
 
 In order to further ensure user protection, the cryptocurrency-based intermediary should 
segregate cryptocurrency and funds belonging to its users from its own cryptocurrency and 
funds.
325
 
 
 
 
                                                 
320
 When such a disclosure should be made is a requirement in terms of section 200.19(a) of the NYSDFS Regulations 
as referenced in Paragraph 4.2.4(b) of the NYSDFS Regulations. 
321
 Kindly please see Paragraph 5.2.1(a)(i)(cc) of this chapter regarding the proposal not to subject a decentralised 
cryptocurrency-based exchange from keeping records of transaction for reasons postulated in the said paragraph. 
322
 The ADGM Guidelines imposes a similar requirement in 19.5. See Paragraph 4.2.4(a) of chapter four in that regard. 
323
 Section 200(9)(b) of the NYSDFS Regulations imposes a similar requirement. See Paragraph 4.2.4(b) of chapter four 
in that regard. 
324
 See Paragraph 2.3.1(b)(iv) of chapter two insofar as it relates to the risk. 
325
 See the discussion under Paragraph 4.2.2(d) of chapter four on Japan’s amended Payment Systems Act. 
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 (vi) Provisions dealing with insolvency of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
 
 If one considers the bankruptcy of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries such as MtGox and 
loss of users’ cryptocurrency in various ways discussed in chapter two, it becomes pertinent 
to ensure that the bankruptcy of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries is addressed in the 
recommended regulatory legal framework. 
 
This should include the manner in which users will be reimbursed in the event of insolvency 
of a cryptocurrency-based intermediary. 
  
 Clarity should be provided how users’ cryptocurrency held in custody should be dealt with in 
the event a cryptocurrency-based intermediary is declared insolvent. It should be clear from 
the outset the return of cryptocurrency should be the main consideration.  
 
Existing legislation governing the liquidation and distribution of assets of a liquidated 
company should not be applied to insolvent cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. The manner 
in which the liquidation of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries should be dealt with should 
be provided for in the recommended regulatory legal framework. 
 
(vii)  Miscellaneous issues 
 
 Miscellaneous issues are matters related to the regulated subject-matter. It should thus include 
punitive measures and/or penalties for non-compliance, breach of conditions imposed and 
contravention of the regulatory framework as well as transitional aspects. 
 
(aa) Transitional period for implementation 
 
 Due to the relative new nature of the recommended regulatory legal framework it is trite to 
introduce and define a transitional period within which all existing cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries should be allowed to put in place mechanisms and programs introduced by the 
recommended regulatory legal framework.
326
 
 
                                                 
326
 This is introduced by the Australian Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006. Kindly 
please see Paragraph 4.2.2(c) of chapter four. 
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 It is thus recommended that cryptocurrency-based intermediaries operating within Africa, or 
specifically within African countries, will be granted a transitional period to develop the 
various programs set out in the recommended regulatory legal framework. The awarding of a 
final licence will be conditional upon the development and implementation of such programs. 
 
(bb) Punitive measures 
 
 Non-compliance with regulatory obligations should result in some form of punitive 
consequences, for instance the failure to obtain a licence to conduct cryptocurrency-related 
services should carry a discontinuance of business and a fine; or the failure to establish and 
implement programs contemplated in the recommended regulatory legal framework should 
carry a fine or even conditional continuance of licensed services. 
 
 Therefore, it is proposed that the recommended regulatory legal framework explicitly set out 
punitive measures and consequent penalties to ensure that non-compliance with the provisions 
of the recommended regulatory legal framework is punishable in some or other form. 
 
(c) Private law aspects  
 
 As previously indicated in this chapter, this research recommends the incorporation of 
mandatory contractual terms into the contractual arrangements between the users and 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries; and to impose an obligation on the cryptocurrency-
based intermediary to allow the user to negotiate any other terms to contractual agreement. 
 
(i)  Mandatory contractual terms 
 
 This paragraph sets out the recommended mandatory contractual terms, which are as follows: 
 
(aa) Define the types of service provided by the cryptocurrency-based intermediary 
 
 The cryptocurrency-based intermediary must ensure that the contractual arrangement clearly 
defines essential terms; and the services provided. 
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(bb) Authorisation to transfer cryptocurrency 
 
 It should be a mandatory term of contract that cryptocurrency wallet providers, inclusive of 
cryptocurrency-based exchanges providing such services, only effect transactions involving a 
user’s key with the written authorisation of the user. 
 
 The cryptocurrency-based intermediary should further commit that affecting the transfer of 
the user’s cryptocurrency without authorisation will be inconsistent with the terms of the 
contract; amount to breach of contract; and that the user will be entitled to the immediate 
return of the cryptocurrency. 
 
(cc) Responsibility to ensure the safe-keeping of the user’s cryptocurrency wallet 
 
 The mandatory contractual terms must impose an obligation on the wallet service provider to 
accept responsibility for the safe-keeping of the user’s cryptocurrency wallet, inclusive of 
affirming the responsibility regarding the secure nature of its internal security systems. 
 
 In addition, if a security breach is due to weak internal security system, the contract terms 
must impose a responsibility on the cryptocurrency-based intermediary to reimburse the user 
for any losses in cryptocurrency suffered by the user, even if such reimbursement if in a 
monetary value instead of cryptocurrency. 
  
(dd) Assurance that the cryptocurrency-based intermediary will warn the user in advance of 
possibility inaccessibility of its website and shut down of website 
 
(ee) Provision of information related to any hacking and loss of cryptocurrency at the time of 
occurrence of such hacking or as soon as reasonably practicable after such hacking 
 
(ff) Right of withdrawal 
 
 The user must be allowed to withdraw any cryptocurrency held in a cryptocurrency storage 
wallet at any time that the user requires, including complete withdrawal and transfer of such 
cryptocurrency to another cryptocurrency-based intermediary or form of storage, for instance 
from online storage to offline storage of the user’s choosing. 
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(gg) Dispute resolution 
  
 Belfrics terms and conditions impose an obligation on the parties to resolve disputes arising 
for the terms and conditions by way of consultation, and if such consultation fails, by way of 
binding arbitration.
327
 The same approach to dispute resolution is proposed as a mandatory 
contractual term. 
 
(hh) Governing law 
  
The resolution of disputes, in respect of Luno are resolved through the Law of Singapore and 
the parities submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore;
328
 and in respect of 
BitPesa, the governing law is specified as the law of Luxembourg.
329
  
 
In both instances, disputes are governed by country laws outside of Africa and users are 
required to ascribe exclusive to the Courts of such countries in order to resolve a dispute.  
 
It is proposed, as a mandatory contractual term, that the governing law applicable in this 
instance should be law of the country within which the cryptocurrency-based intermediary 
operates.  
 
The Terms of Use and Terms and Conditions analysed in chapter two
330
 of cryptocurrency-based 
intermediaries operating within South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya specify some of the mandatory 
contractual term recommended in this paragraph however, in order to address the user related risks, 
the aforementioned mandatory contractual terms are proposed. 
 
(ii) Negotiation of terms not recommended as mandatory contractual terms 
 
 Any other terms of contract to utilise cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ services must be 
subject to negotiation between the cryptocurrency-based intermediary and the user. In other 
words, the user must be afforded an option to negotiate any other contractual term that is not a 
mandatory contractual term. 
                                                 
327
 See Paragraph 2.2.2(e) of chapter two in this regard. 
328
 See Paragraph 2.2.1 of chapter two in this regard. 
329
 See Paragraph 2.2.3 of chapter two in this regard. 
330
 See Paragraph 2.2 of chapter two on the discussion of the contractual terms of Luno, Belfrics and BitPesa. 
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5.3 Administrator of the recommended regulatory legal framework 
 
 As can be attested by the discussion in chapter three, cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
provide financial services similar to those provided by conventional financial intermediaries 
therefore, regulators tasked with the regulation of conventional financial intermediaries 
should be tasked to regulate cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
5.4 Additional issues that may not fall within the scope of regulation 
 
 The recommended regulatory framework must additionally impose a duty on regulators to 
propose and influence change in criminalizing cryptocurrency theft where the prevailing 
definition of theft does not include, as an offence, the theft of cryptocurrency.  
 
5.5 Application of the recommended regulatory legal framework within Africa 
 
 It is trite to point out that in recommending a regulatory legal framework for cryptocurrency-
based intermediaries and intermediation, the purpose was to allow for its application 
uniformly within Africa, or to design a model that can point out pertinent issues for 
regulation. 
 
 The aforementioned recommended regulatory legal framework is based on the operational 
nature of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. For instance, as postulated in chapter two, 
Luno, Belfrics and BitPesa operate across Africa by conducting services within various 
African countries.  
 
 If each of those African countries within which these cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
operate have different legislation governing cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, users may 
not obtain the same type of protection, and a cryptocurrency-based intermediary may choose 
to operate in a country with little or no regulation. 
 
 This will result in inadequate and ineffective user protection and will additionally allow 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries to shop around for a country within Africa with the 
weakest regulatory framework increasing the risk of money laundering, theft of 
cryptocurrency, increased cyber security breaches and poor user protection. 
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 The aim of this research ultimately was to design a regulatory legal framework aimed at 
addressing, detecting, minimizing, mitigating and monitoring the aforementioned risks within 
the African context; and to maximize the safe, secure and trusted use of the services provided 
by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries in Africa. 
 
 Such safe, secure and trusted use will only be intensified if users, whichever cryptocurrency-
based intermediary they utilise, for instance in South Africa, know that the regulatory 
framework is the same or closely related, providing similar protection anywhere else in 
Africa. 
 
 This essentially means that the aforementioned recommended regulatory approach may be 
adopted by regional economic communities in Africa and applied uniformly within that 
regional economic community; or by a continental body such as the African Union. 
 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
The aim of this research was to make a case for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ regulation in 
Africa, and thereafter to design a regulatory framework for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries. 
 
The aforementioned was the result of discussion undertaken throughout this research; and for 
identification, detection, monitoring and mitigation of cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ related 
risks and users’ risks.  
 
The recommended regulatory framework should be implemented in such a manner that it does not 
stifle innovation and block the potential benefits that cryptocurrency-based intermediation may 
provide to African countries and their citizens.  
It should essentially be aimed at creating and building of trust in the services provided by 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, whilst addressing the potential risk such service provision and 
the use of such services may pose to users. 
 
Finally, the recommended regulatory legal framework for cryptocurrency-based intermediaries 
advanced herein will be suitable and adequate to identify, detect, monitor and mitigate 
cryptocurrency-based intermediaries’ related risks and users’ risks. 
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